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Deportation Procedures 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1979, Congress created the Office of Special Investigations (OSI),1 as a 
branch of the Department of Justice, to investigate and prosecute individuals 
living in the United States who actively took part in the Nazi persecution of 
civilians during World War IJ.2 Allan A. Ryan, Jr., former Director of 
OSI, estimates that, of the 400,000 European refugees who came to the United 
States after the war under the Displaced Persons Act (DPA) of 1948,3 
1 The OSI was created within the Department of Justice by the Appropriation Authorization Act, 
Fiscal Year 1980, Pub. L. No. 132, § 22, 93 Stat. 1040, 1050, see 8 U.S.C. § 1551 (1982); see also 28 
C.F.R. § 0.55(f) (1985). 
2 See id. The term "Nazi war criminal" is widely used to describe individuals who actively took part 
in the Nazi persecution of civilians during World War II. The majority of such individuals who live 
in the United States, however, unlike the Nazi war criminals prosecuted by the Nuremberg war crime 
tribunals, were neitJ;ter directly involved in the war nor part of the upper echelon of the Nazi hierarchy. 
See Taylor, The Nuremberg War Crimes Trials, 450 INT'L CONC. 241, 249-50 (1949). Rather, these "Nazi 
war criminals" are, for the most part, individuals who directly participated or assisted with the Nazi 
persecution of civilian populations on the basis of race, religion, national origin, or political opinion. 
The Immigration and Nationality (Holtzman) Amendment of 1978, Pub. L. No. 549, 92 Stat. 2065 
(codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(33); 1182(d)(3); 1251(a)(19); 1253(h); and 1254(e) (1982)) [hereinafter 
cited as the Holtzman Amendment] added the following category of individuals to both excludable 
and deportable classes of aliens: 
Any alien who during the period beginning on March 23, 1933, and ending on May 8, 1945, 
under the direction of, or in association with 
(A) the Nazi government in Germany, 
(B) any government in any area occupied by the military forces of the Nazi government of 
Germany, 
(C) any government established with the assistance or cooperation of the Nazi government 
of Germany, or 
(D) any government which was an ally of the Nazi government of Germany, ordered, 
incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of "ny person because of race, 
religion, national origin, or political opinion. 
8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(33); 1251(a)(19). Therefore, throughout this Comment the individuals in question 
are referred to as Nazi persecutors. For a comprehensive documentation of the Nazi persecution and 
mass murder during World War II, see R. HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF EUROPEAN JEWRY (1963) 
[hereinafter cited as HILBERG]. 
5 Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 774, 62 Stat. 1009 [hereinafter cited as DPAl. This 
original version of the DPA was enacted for a two-year period. DPA, § 3(a), supra, at 1010. In 1950, 
Congress extended it for another two years. Act to Amend the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. 
L. No. 555,64 Stat. 219 [hereinafter cited as Act to Amend the Displaced Persons Act of 1948]. An 
estimated one million people were homeless after World War II, either unwilling or unable to return 
to their native lands; most fled to displaced person camps set up within the Allied Zones of Europe. 
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two and one-half percent had likely been Nazi persecutors.4 Therefore, 
See S. REp. No. 950, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2028, 
2035 [hereinafter cited as S. Rep. No. 950]. The United States reacted to this influx of displaced 
persons by enacting the DPA in 1948. See DPA, supra. This Act bypassed existing quota restrictions, 
thereby enabling 200,000 refugees to immigrate to the United States from Europe over a two-year 
period. A. RYAN,JR., QUIET NEIGHBORS: PROSECUTING NAZI WAR CRIMINALS IN AMERICA 15-16 (1984) 
[hereinafter cited as RYAN]. In enacting the DPA, Congress adopted an exclusionary section from the 
Constitution of the International Relief Organization (IRO), which was set up by the United Nations 
in 1946 to address the displaced persons problem. See S. Rep. No. 950, supra, at 2029. This section 
excluded the following individuals from eligibility under the DPA: 
I. War criminals, quislings and traitors. 
2. Any other person who can be shown: 
(a) to have assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations of countries, mem-
bers of the United Nations; or 
(b) to have voluntarily assisted the enemy forces since the outbreak of the second 
world war in their operations against the United Nations. 
S. Rep. No. 950, supra, at 252. 
4 RYAN, supra note 3, at 26. The DPA did not prevent the entry of Nazi persecutors into the United 
States for two reasons. First, the DPA itself was inherently skewed in favor of probable Nazi persecutors 
and against those individuals who were most likely to be victims of such Nazi persecution. RYAN, supra 
note 3, at 16. Whether such a result was actually premeditated or was unintentional, is at best left to 
historical consideration of the legislation. See RYAN, supra note 3, at 26-28. Nevertheless, this beneficial 
outcome for Nazi persecutors was a direct consequence of the operation of four provisions in the 
DPA. Section 2(c), which defined those displaced persons who were eligible under the Act, included 
only those persons who had arrived at the displaced person camps on or before December 22, 1945. 
This automatically excluded over 100,000 Jews who were released from Polish concentration camps 
in 1946, thereby rendering 85 percent of all Jews who stayed in the displaced person camps ineligible 
to qualify under the DPA. DPA, supra note 3, § 2(c), at 1009. See also RYAN, supra note 3, at 16. See 
generally L. DINNERSTEIN, AMERICA AND THE SURVIVORS OF THE HOLOCAUST (1982). 
Section 3(a) provided that not less than 40 percent of the visas issued were to be available exclusively 
to persons "whose place of origin or country of nationality has been de facto annexed by a foreign 
power." DPA, supra note 3, § 3(a), at 1010. Thus, the DPA in effect gave special preference to all 
fleeing Eastern Europeans and Baltics. This inevitably favored Nazi persecutors. Of those fleeing 
Eastern Europe after the war, a significant portion were most certainly Nazi collaborators since their 
lives depended on escape to the West. See RYAN, supra note 3, at 13-14. 
Finally, despite an IRO provision explicitly excluding from visa eligibility "Volksdeutsche" (German 
ethnics of Eastern Europe) Congress included within the DPA a special preference for 50,000 of such 
people. See DPA, supra note 3, § 12, at 1013; see also RYAN, supra note 3, at 17. 
The second reason for the failure of the DPA to exclude Nazi persecutors from immigrating to the 
United States was the administration of the statute itself. Congress created a Displaced Persons 
Commission (DPC), which delegated the responsibility for implementing and policing the DPA pro-
visions to the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) of the U.S. Army. See DPA, supra note 3, § 8, at 1012; 
RYAN, supra note 3, at 21. Despite security checks conducted on DPA applicants, Nazi persecutors 
nonetheless slipped by in great numbers. RYAN, supra note 3, at 21-22. The task of granting entry 
visas was enormous, involving the processing of hundreds of thousands of people, and many applicants 
were given clearance on their backgrounds merely on the basis of a calculated risk that they would 
qualify. See Nazi War Criminals (Part II): Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and 
International Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 154 
(1978) (testimony of Mario DeCapua, Former Chief, Security & Investigations Displaced Persons 
Commission (Europe». 
By 1949, the failings of the DPA had become apparent; thus, when Congress amended the Act in 
1950, extending it for another two years, it eliminated the 1945 cutoff date, removed the preferences 
for Eastern Europeans and farmers (but not for persons of German origin), and added a provision 
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approximately 10,000 Nazi persecutors entered the United States 
illegally.5 
Until the creation of OSI in 1979, the U.S. government had done little to 
respond to repeated requests to investigate this consequence of U.S. immigra-
tion law.6 The current U.S. government policy, as implemented by OSI, man-
dates that individuals who directly participated in Nazi persecution are neither 
entitled to live in the United States, nor qualified to enjoy the rights and 
privileges of U.S. citizenship. Thus, these individuals should be removed from 
the country through the sanctions of denaturalization and deportation. 7 Al-
which explicitly excluded anyone who had taken part in persecution. Act to Amend the Displaced 
Persons Act of 1948, supra note 3, §§ 4,6, 12(a), 13, at 219. 
When the DPA expired on June 30, 1952, almost 400,000 immigrants had come to the United 
States.Id. at 25. In assessing the overall impact of the DPA, Allan Ryan, Jr., noted: 
[T]he facts are undeniable: in many areas of Europe occupied by the Nazis, there was 
widespread collaboration. As the war ended, many of the collaborators fled rather than remain 
to endure the retribution of the victors. They ended up in [displaced person] camps with the 
victims of war. The United States took in hundreds of thousands of the camps' inhabitants, 
and the preferences went to groups with known patterns of collaboration. The pressure to 
move bodies, to stimulate production, was intense, and individual investigations were cursory 
and unreliable. As a result, the applicants were sifted through a screen of very coarse mesh. 
RYAN, supra note 3, at 27. 
In 1952, Congress redrafted the permanent immigration and nationality statutes by enacting the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-
1557 (1982» [hereinafter cited as INA], which contained no specific exclusion for Nazis or for those 
who had assisted in persecution of civilians. RYAN, supra note 3, at 264. This statutory loophole, under 
the permanent immigration law, was closed by the Holtzman Amendment in 1978. See supra note 2. 
Despite the liberal provisions of the INA, the State Department retained great discretion over the 
issuance of visas. See RYAN, supra note 3, at 264. And between 1952 and 1956, State Department 
regulations pertaining to the issuance of visas under the INA, did bar aliens who either were charged 
or convicted of being war criminals, or who had engaged in "conduct contrary to civilization and 
human decency." See 22 C.F.R. § 42.42G) (1953); § 53.33(j) (1949). 
A subsequent special refugee measure was also enacted by Congress in 1953, entitled the Refugee 
Relief Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 203, 67 Stat. 400 [hereinafter cited as RRA]. This Act, which was in 
effect from 1953 to 1956, contained a section excluding former persecutors. RRA, supra, § 14(a), at 
406. Despite this prohibition, the RRA did not provide for any effective means of enforcement. RYAN, 
supra note 3, at 327. U.S. officials entrusted to police these exclusive provisions tended to use "com· 
munism" as the dispositive factor and did little in investigating the visa applicants' activities during 
the Nazi era. Id. 
S RYAN, supra note 3, at 26. 
6 RYAN, supra note 3, at 29-64; see generally Nazi War Criminals (Part I): Hearings Before the Subcommittee 
on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (congressional investigation of accusations of government conspiracy to 
"coverup" entrance of Nazi persecutors into the United States). 
7 See RYAN, supra note 3, at 261. Neil Sher, the current Director of OSI, in a recent interview stated 
his view of the U.S. government policy toward Nazi persecutors: 
These people were involved in acts of genocide, murder and persecution unparalleled in 
history ... [those] involved in these types of activities [are] simply not fit to live here, not fit 
to have the rights of United States citizenship, and to do nothing about it would be to condone 
those activities. 
The Hunt For Nazis Shifts Into "High Gear," N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1984, at E3, col. 1 (interview with 
Neil Sher). 
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though a Nazi persecutor who has entered the United States illegally may be 
subject to deportation immediately, this is not possible where the individual is 
a U.S. citizen.s Since most former Nazi persecutors acquired U.S. citizenship 
through naturalization, OSI must, in order to revoke the citizenship status of 
these discovered Nazi persecutors, bring denaturalization actions prior to insti-
tuting deportation hearings. 9 
Denaturalization and deportation involve two separate legal processes within 
immigration and nationalization law. lo In a denaturalization action, the defen-
dant is entitled to an initial trial in federal district court with the right of appeal 
to a circuit court of appeals and ultimately, if certiorari is granted, to the U.S. 
Supreme Court. II A deportation action entails an initial administrative hearing 
before an immigration judge, an administrative appeal to the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals (BIA), and then a subsequent right to judicial review by a 
circuit court of appeals and by the U.S. Supreme Court, upon a grant of 
certiorari.12 Under current immigration and nationalization law, it is not possible 
to combine these two processes. 13 Together, excluding time delays and the actual 
implementation of the alien's departure, these two procedures can take up to 
seven years to complete. 14 Consequently, the existing procedure for handling 
8 One who has entered the United States in violation of the INA or any other law of the United 
States, or who at the time of entry was within a class of aliens excludable by the law existing at the 
time of entry, is deportable. 8 U.S.C. § 1251. The deportation provisions enacted by Congress in the 
INA pertain to only "[a]ny alien in the United States .... " 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a). The term "alien" means 
any person not a citizen or national of the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (1982). Therefore, the 
alienage of an individual must be proved in order to establish jurisdiction to order his deportation. 
Ng Fung Ho v. White. 259 U.S. 276. 284 (1922). See also infra text accompanying notes 247-51. 
9 See OSI, U.S. Department of Justice. Digest of Cases in Litigation. May 24, 1985 [hereinafter cited 
as OSlo Digest of Cases]. Between 1979 and 1984. the U.S. government. through the OSlo has reviewed 
about 850 individuals of whom approximately 300 are currently still under investigation. With Late 
Start. Nazi-Hunters Running Out of Time. Chi. Daily L. Bull., Jan. 21. 1985, at 1. col. I. Out of 44 cases 
initiated by OSI since 1979. 23 have been denaturalization cases and 19 have been deportation cases, 
while two others resulted in agreements to relinquish citizenship and depart the United States. See 
generally OSlo Digest of Cases. supra. at 1-36. Of these 19 deportation cases. 12 have been against 
individuals who never acquired naturalized United States citizenship. Id. Approximately 25 denatur-
alization and deportation cases are still pending at various stages of litigation. Id. The denaturalization 
actions have resulted in 12 revocations of citizenship; deportation actions have resulted in 10 orders 
of deportation. /d. In 1983 and 1984. six Nazi persecutors departed the United States permanently; 
three of them left voluntarily. without being deported. Id. It is the OSI policy to file deportation 
charges against every competent defendant whose citizenship has been revoked. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252 
(1982); see also RYAN, supra note 3. at 258. 
10 While denaturalization is adjudicated in a civil non-jury trial in federal district court. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1451(a) (1982), deportation is administratively determined by an immigration judge through the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b). See infra text accompanying notes 
111-35. 
118 U.S.c. § 1451(a); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1345 (1982). 
12 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b); 8 C.F.R. § 242.21 (1986). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1982). 
13 RYAN. supra note 3. at 259. 
14 See RYAN. supra note 3. at 259-60. The process can take from five to seven years. assuming that 
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OSI's cases against naturalized Nazi persecutors unnecessarily delays the im-
position of justice. In addition, such delay can circumvent the final adjudication 
of these cases. Many Nazi persecutors have died before a final determination 
on their case is made, thereby they enjoy the privileges of U.S. citizenship and 
residence and live out their lives in the United States. 15 
The requirement of two separate proceedings, with separate layers of appeal, 
is inefficient because much of the litigation is repetitive. 16 Both proceedings 
involve the use of the same evidence against the alleged Nazi persecutor; spe-
cifically, evidence pertaining to the individual's prior conduct during the Hol-
ocaust and subsequent immigration to the United States. 17 
The five to seven years of protracted litigation and seven separate layers of 
initial adjudications and appeals cause delay which is unfair to both the govern-
ment and the individual defendant involved. A defendant determined to post-
pone the outcome of these procedures has an inordinate number of opportu-
nities to do SO.18 At the same time, defendants who prolong the process in their 
there are no extensive delays. justice Dept. Seeking to Speed Nazi Inquiries, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1980, at 
34, col. 1. See also Legal Red Tape Hinders justice Dept. Campaign to Oust Suspected Nazis, L.A. Times, 
Nov. 15, 1984, at 35, col. 1. Some cases are subject to additional judicial delay. RYAN, supra note 3, at 
259. In one of the denaturalization cases, United States v. Kowalchul<, Civ. No. 77-118, the trial ended 
in December 198!. and the district judge did not hand down the verdict umil July 1983. OSI, Digest 
of Cases, supra note 9, at 6. In many deportation cases, the immigration judges render the decisions 
more than a year after the hearings. RYAN, supra note 3, at 259. There may also be a delay of a year 
or more between the filing of the case and the actual trial date. /d. at 260. 
l5 See OSI, Digest of Cases, supra note 9, at 36-56 (cases no longer active: eight out of eighteen cases 
(45 percent) because the defendants died prior to final disposition of their cases; two were suicides). 
See also N. Sher, Director, OSI, Address to the Anti-Defamation League National Conference, New York (May 
31,1984) (available from the Department of Justice). 
16 Matter of Fedorenko, Interim Decision No. 2963 (Board of Immigration Appeals 1984), at 14 
[herein_.fter cited as Matter of Fedorenko] (the BIA held that the facts and conclusions of law in the 
prior denaturalization case are also dispositive in the subsequent deportation hearing involving a 
former Nazi persecutor). 
17/d. at 11. 
18 See RYAN, supra note 3, at 142-98 & 218-44. The cases against Andrija Artukovic and Viorel 
Trifa are two of the most notorious examples of how a defendant may manipulate the process in his 
favor. Artukovic arrived in the lJnited States in 1948 under a false name. Artukovic v. INS, 693 F.2d 
894, 896 (9th Cir. 1982). Although he was ordered deported in 1952, he obtained a pre-Holtzman 
Amendment withholding of deportation in 1959, see infra note 132, upon a determination that de-
portation back to his home country, Yugoslavia, would subject him to "persecution." Artukovic, 693 
F.2d at 896. In addition, Artukovic also successfully avoided a nine-year attempt by Yugoslavia to 
extradite him in order to face charges for ordering the execution and persecution of hundreds of 
thousands of Serbs, Jews, Gypsies and other civilians. Artukovic v. Boyle, 107 F. Supp. 11 (S.D. Cal. 
1952), rev'd sub. nom. Ivancevic v. Artukovic, 211 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 818 
(1955), remanded with order to discharge, 140 F. Supp. 245 (S.D. Cal. 1956). afl'd sub. nom. Karadzole v. 
Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957), vacated, 355 U.S. 393 (1958), remanded sub. nom. United States 
v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal. 1959). A Commissioner for the district court finally found 
him non-extraditable in 1959 on the basis of insufficient evidence, and because of the "political 
character" of the alleged offenses. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. at 392-93. OSI reinitiated the deportation 
process against Artukovic after the Holtzman Amendment was passed and precluded him from 
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own self-interest are burdened with the cost in time and legal fees incurred by 
these proceedings. 19 The excessive delay resulting from the existing process is 
unnecessary, because Congress has the power to amend immigration and nat-
uralization law and consolidate the denaturalization and deportation proceed-
ings.20 Moreover, Congress could provide such a consolidated procedure with-
out infringing on any constitutional protections afforded to the defendant. 21 
This Comment examines the feasibility of such a proposed consolidated de-
naturalization/deportation procedure, beginning with a consideration of the two 
separate processes under existing law. The Comment delineates the policies 
continued eligibility for the discretionary relief. RYAN, supra note 3. at 271. On appeal, however, the 
Ninth Circuit held that OSI could not rely on the original order of deportation and must retry the 
case. Artukovic, 693 F.2d at 899. Deportation hearings were scheduled, and a new request was filed by 
Yugoslavia for Artukovic's extradition to stand charges for murder. U.S. Seizes Artukovic as Nazi War 
Criminal, L.A. Times, Nov. 15, 1984, at I, col. I. After being arrested and held in custody, the 
extradition request for Artukovic was granted in 1985. Artukovic v. Rison, 784 F.2d 1354, 1355 (9th 
Cir. 1986) (motion to stay extradition to Yugoslavia pending appeal on habeas petition denied). He 
was extradited to Yugoslavia and put on trial for murder in early 1986. Accused Nazi Criminal Extradited 
to Yugoslavia, Boston Globe, Feb. 13, 1986, at 7, col. I. Artukovic subsequently was convicted and 
sentenced to death for ordering mass killings and deportations. as Minister of the Interior of the Nazi-
supported government from 1941 to 1945. His sentence will not be carried out until he is allowed to 
appeal through both local and federal Yugoslavian court systems. Croatian War Criminal Sentenced to 
Firing Squad, N.Y. Times. May 15, 1986, at A2, col. 3. 
Unlike Artukovic, Trifa obtained naturalized U.S. citizenship. OSI, Digest of Cases, supra note 9, at 
52. Denaturalization charges were filed against him by the INS in 1975. Id. In 1980, Trifa consented 
by agreement with the OSI to denaturalization. Id. See also RYAN, supra note 3, at 240-41. Nevertheless, 
within a month he appealed this consent judgment, which served to delay the process by a year. See 
OSI, Digest of Cases, supra note 9, at 52. In 1981, the Sixth Circuit affirmed Trifa's denaturalization, 
United States v. Trifa. 662 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1981). and in 1982, the Supreme Court denied his 
petition for certiorari. Trifa v. United States. 456 U.S. 975 (1982). On the third day of his deportation 
trial held in October 1982, Trifa conceded deportability and waived all appeals. OSI, Digest of Cases, 
supra note 9, at 53; see also RYAN, supra note 3, at 241-43. Nevertheless, he made two subsequent 
attempts to obtain a suspension of his deportation. OSI, Digest of Cases, supra note 9, at 53. It was 
not until August of 1984. that Portugal took Trifa on a temporary basis and he departed. Id. See also 
infra note 166. 
19 This has been a complaint of many of the Nazi persecutor/defendants. See Hunting Nazis: Trying 
Task for Immigration, Nat'l L.J. Nov. 6,1978, at 5, col. 3. 
'0 Congress has the power, granted by the U.S. Constitution, to establish a uniform rule of natural-
ization. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. cl. 4. Congress has the power to prescribe grounds for denaturalization 
from this power and the power derived from the necessary and proper clause of the U.S. Constitution, 
art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 673 (1945). Additionally, Congress' power to 
prescribe grounds for deportation has been deemed both absolute and unqualified. Fong Yue Ting v. 
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893), and plenary. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 534 (1952). 
The fact that the formulation of these policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress, has become "as 
firmly embedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our 
government." Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954). Thus, even though deportation is administered 
through the offices of the executive branch, the requirement for separate proceedings to denaturalize 
and deport Nazi persecutors could be changed by Congress without infringing on the separation of 
powers. See infra text accompanying notes 111-20. 
'I See infra notes 237-97 and accompanying text. Congress' power to enact and amend immigration 
and naturalization law appears to be limitless, if not plenary. See Galvan, 347 U.S. at 530-32; see also 
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977). 
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underlying the denaturalization and deportation procedures, and discusses their 
application against alleged Nazi persecutors. The author then proposes a sta-
tutory addition to the immigration and nationality law found in Title VIII of 
the United States Code, which would combine these two procedures into a 
single action with a bifurcated initial hearing and consolidated appeal. This new 
procedure could apply to actions brought against alleged Nazi persecutors 
through any of three alternative legislative classifications. Next, the author 
analyzes the constitutionality of such a proposed procedure, and its possible 
applications, focusing on the due process, equal protection and citizenship clause 
ramifications. Finally, the author considers the practicality of joining these ju-
dicial and administrative functions together. 
II. DENATURALIZATION 
A. Purpose and Use of Procedure 
In order for an alien to become a naturalized cItizen of the United States, 
specific statutory preconditions must be met. 22 Most importantly, the alien must 
have been lawfully admitted for permanent residence, followed by actual con-
tinuous residence for five years preceeding the filing of a petition for natural-
ization. 23 The petitioner must also be a person of good moral character.24 Once 
a person becomes a naturalized citizen through judicial decree, that person is 
entitled to nearly all the rights and privileges bestowed upon the natural born 
22 An applicant must strictly comply with all congressionally imposed prerequisites to acquire natu-
ralized citizenship. United States v. Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d 488, 493 (3d Cir. 1985). One must petition 
the proper court, 8 U.S.C. § 1445 (1982); have an understanding of the English language, 8 U.S.c. 
§ 1423 (1982); not advocate, be a member of, or affiliate with any organization that advocates or 
teaches opposition to all organized government (including prohibitions on Communist association), 8 
U.S.C. § 1424 (1982); and, not be a deserter from the armed forces, 8 U.S.C. § 1425 (1982). In 
addition, the petitioner must meet the specific preconditions for naturalization, including lawful 
admittance for permanent residence followed by continuous residence for five years before filing a 
petition for naturalization, and standing as a person of good moral character, 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) 
(1982). The petitioner may be subject to an investigation, 8 U.S.c. § 1446 (1982), examined under 
oath in open court, 8 U.S.C. § 1447(a) (1982), and must take an oath of renunciation and allegiance, 
8 U.S.C. § 1448 (1982). The Supreme Court has long viewed the grant of naturalization as a privilege, 
and not an absolute right. See United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 472, 475 (1917). 
23 8 U.S.C. § 1427(b). 
24 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a). The application for naturalization must show that during the five-year statu-
tory period before the filing, and until the final hearing, the petitioner "has been and still is a person 
of good moral character .... " Id. Although Congress enumerated specific classes of individuals deemed 
not to be of good moral character, 8 U.S.C. § 1l01(f)(8) (1982), "[t]he fact that any person is not 
within any of [these] classes [does] not preclude that for other reasons such person is or was not of 
good moral character." Id. Despite exclusion by this statute, courts have held that an individual cannot 
satisfy this precondition to valid naturalization if he participated in Nazi persecution. United States v. 
Linnas, 527 F. Supp. 426, 439-40 (E.D.N. Y. 1981), aff'd, 685 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 
U.S. 883 (1982). 
368 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. IX, No.2 
citizen.25 The fourteenth amendment states that "[alII persons born or natural-
ized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of 
the United States .... "26 The Supreme Court has interpreted this clause as 
bestowing upon the naturalized citizen who has met all the statutory precon-
ditions the right not to have one's citizenship taken away.27 The one exception 
to this right, however, applies where it is shown that the person either engaged 
in fraud in the naturalization process, or was never lawfully entitled to the grant 
of citizenship because all conditions precedent were not met. 28 
Congressional power to create the statutory prerequisites necessary to acquire 
naturalized citizenship is derived from article I of the Constitution, which 
provides that Congress has sole constitutional authority to "establish a uniform 
rule of naturalization."29 Congress may also create a procedure, such as dena-
turalization, for annulling a grant of naturalized citizenship where the precon-
ditions are later discovered to be unfulfilled.30 Denaturalization "makes nothing 
25 Knauer, 328 U.S. at 658 quoting Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 22 (1913). "Citizenship obtained 
through naturalization is not a second-class citizenship. It has been said that citizenship carries with it 
all of the rights and prerogatives of citizenship obtained by birth in this country 'save that of eligibility 
to the presidency.' " [d. U.S. citizenship has consistently been viewed by the Supreme Court as a 
precious basic right. See Perez v. Brownwell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, C.]., dissenting); Knauer, 
328 U.S. at 659 quoting Ng Fung Ho, 259 U.S. at 284. 
26 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
27 Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 261-62 (1967). 
28/d. at 267 n.23. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a). Congress has enacted provisions which make a citizen's 
voluntary action result in a surrender of his or her citizenship. 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1982). These are 
known as expatriation statutes, which include, inter alia, provisions for U.S. citizens who obtain natu-
ralized citizenship in a foreign state, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(I); take an oath of allegiance to a foreign state, 
§ 1481(a)(2); serve in the armed forces of a foreign state without proper authorization, § 1481(a)(3); 
take employment with a foreign government, § 1481(a)(4); make a formal renunciation of citizenship, 
§ 1481(a)(5); and commit treason, § 1481(a)(7). The expatriation provisions have come under frequent 
constitutional attack. See generally Afroyim, 387 U.S. 253 (repealed as unconstitutional expatriation 
provision for voting in a foreign election because Congress has no power to expatriate without the 
citizen's assent). C[ Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980) (although Congress has no general power 
to expatriate without requiring a showing of citizen's specific intent to relinquish voluntarily his U.S. 
citizenship, statute providing that the government need only prove such intent by preponderance of 
the evidence standard was not unconstitutional). See also 8 u.s.c. § 1483 (1982). 
29 U.S. CON ST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. See also Trujillo-Hernandez v. Farrell, 503 F.2d 954, 958 (5th CiL), 
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 977 (1974) (Congress' power to establish conditions precedent to naturalization 
is not subject to judicial review because Congress has the exclusive constitutional authority to do so, 
thus the district court dismissed class action challenging 8 U .S.C. § 1423(i) as a nonjusticiable contro-
versy). 
30 United States v. Jerome, 115 F. Supp. 818 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (upheld the constitutionality of 8 U .S.C. 
§ 1451 and recognized that an alien has no moral or constitutional right to retain privileges of 
citizenship if fraud was practiced upon the court). The Supreme Court has upheld denaturalization 
statutes on the basis of both Congress' power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and the 
necessary and proper clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See, e.g., Knauer, 328 U.S. at 673. See also 
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 124 (l943)(despite the serious consequences of the loss 
of citizenship, "[itl does not mean that once granted to an alien, citizenship cannot be revoked or 
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fraudulent or unlawful that was honest and lawful when it was done ... " but 
simply revokes from the naturalized person, "a privilege that was never right-
fully [that person's]."31 
Denaturalization serves as a safeguard for the integrity of both the natural-
ization process and U.S. citizenship itself.32 Through a denaturalization action, 
the government may revoke a prior grant of naturalized citizenship to an 
individual, such as a former Nazi persecutor, who has failed to meet the statutory 
prerequisites and therefore has procured his certificate of naturalization fraud-
ulently and illegally.33 The denaturalization process entails a direct attack upon 
the original naturalization judgment.34 
Congress and the courts have created some special procedures for use in 
denaturalization hearings. For example, the denaturalization procedure applies 
retroactively to any improperly obtained certificate of naturalization.35 In ad-
dition, no statute of limitations applies to denaturalization suits and the govern-
ment may at any time challenge an improperly acquired naturalization.36 There-
cancelled on legal grounds under appropriate proof"); Luria, 231 u.s. at 24 (denaturalization statute 
imposes no penalty and no discrimination to naturalized citizens since it merely annulled, through 
appropriate judicial proceeding, questionable certificates of citizenship "to which their possessors never 
were lawfully entitled"). 
31 Johanessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 242 (1912). 
32 Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 506-07 (1981). See also C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, 
IMMIGRATION LAW & PROCEDURE § 20.3, at 10-12 (rev. ed. 1985) [hereinafter cited as GORDON & 
ROSENFIELD]. 
33 8 U.S.c. § 1451(a). See alw infra notes 38-51 and accompanying text. 
34 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 32, § 20.2, at 20-24.1. A judicial grant of naturalization cannot 
be attacked collaterally if it is valid on its face. Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 577 (1926). 
Congress may, however, prescribe a direct attack on the prior judgment through an independent 
denaturalization proceeding. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a). See also supra note 32. 
35 United States v. Kairys, 782 F.2d 1374, 1381-82 (7th Cir. 1986) (Congress intended the denatur-
alization statute to apply retroactively); see 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) & (i); see also GORDON & ROSENFIELD, 
supra note 32, § 20.2d, at 8-9. The Supreme Court rejected an ex post facto challenge to one of the 
INA's predecessors, the Act of June 29,1906, Pub. L. No. 338, § 15,34 Stat. 596, 601, on the grounds 
that the law did not entail a punishment. johannessen, 225 U.S. at 241-42. The Supreme Court has 
also upheld the validity of the current statute against such challenges. Costello v. United States, 365 
U.S. 265 (1961). See also Kairys, 782 F.2d at 1382-83 (retroactive application of the statute does not 
violate prohibition against ex post facto laws, since denaturalization does not punish naturalized citizens 
for post-naturalization acts); United States v. Koziy, 728 F.2d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 1984) (rejected an 
ex post facto challenge to the denaturalization statute in a case brought against a former Nazi persecutor). 
36 United States v. Walus, 453 F. Supp. 699, 716 (N.D.Ill. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 616 F.2d 283 
(7th Cir. 1980) (a certificate of naturalization obtained illegally is void ab initio, and thus no statute of 
limitations is applicable to the denaturalization process). See also Kairys, 782 F.2d at 1384 (since 
government was unaware of defendant's illegal presence until 1977, and brought suit in 1980 after 
an investigation, the defendant did not demonstrate lack of diligence and prejudice necessary to give 
rise to the doctrine of laches); Costelio, 365 U.S. at 281-83 (1961) (a delay of 27 years before a 
denaturalization action was commenced did not justify a defense of laches, where the delay did not 
cause defendant any prejudice or denial of due process); United States v. Oddo, 314 F.2d 115, 118 
(2d Cir. 1963). 
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fore, denaturalization cases have been successfully brought against Nazi 
persecutors despite the fact that their certificates of naturalization were granted 
over twenty years prior to the commencement of the revocation action. 37 
B. Grounds 
The current denaturalization statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), provides that citi-
zenship may be invalidated if procured illegally, or by concealment or willful 
misrepresentation of a material fact. 38 Although both of these offenses are 
commonly charged together in the same complaint, the illegal procurement 
charge has become more useful and better suited to denaturalization cases 
against alleged Nazi persecutors, particularly after the Supreme Court's ruling 
in Fedorenko v. United States. 39 
The Fedorenko Court, in ruling on the denaturalization of a former guard 
at Treblinka,40 upheld the revocation of his citizenship on the illegal pro-
37 See generally United States v. Dercacz, 530 F. Supp. 1348 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); OSI, Digest of Cases, 
supra note 9, at 38. 
38 The denaturalization statute states, in relevant part, that: 
It shall be the duty of the United States attorneys ... upon affidavit showing good cause 
thereof, to institute proceedings ... for the purpose of revoking and setting aside the order 
admitting such person to citizenship and canceling the certificate of naturalization on the 
ground that such order and certificate of naturalization were illegally procured or were 
procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation, and such revo-
cation and setting aside ... shall be effective as of the original date of the order and certificate 
8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1982). 
Prior to the enactment of the INA in 1952, the Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 853, § 338(a), 
54 Stat. 1137,1158, reenacted the original provisions of the 1906 Act, Pub. L. No. 338, § 15,34 Stat. 
596, 60 I, thereby reaffirming both grounds which justify denaturalization: fraud and illegality. When 
Congress first passed the INA, however, it deleted the ground of illegal procurement as a basis of 
denaturalization. INA, supra note 4, § 340, at 260; GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 32, § 20.4c, at 
17. The INA changed the grounds by authorizing revocation of naturalization where procured "by 
concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation." INA, supra note 4, § 340, at 260. But 
Congress amended 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) in 1961 by reintroducing the illegal procurement ground. See 
H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 
2950, 2983 [hereinafter cited as House Report 1086]. 
39 Fedorenko V. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981). See also GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 32, 
§ 20.4c, at 20. 
40 The Supreme Court, in describing the Nazi death camp at Treblinka, noted that it: 
contained only living facilities for the SS and the persons working there. The thousands who 
arrived daily on the trains had no need for barracks or mess halls: they would be dead before 
nightfall. It was operated with a barbarous methodology - brutally efficient - and such 
camps surely fill one of the darkest chapters in the annals of human existence, certainly the 
darkest in that which we call Western civilization. 
Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 494 n.2 (quoting United States V. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893, 901 n.12 
(S.D.Fla. 1978». An estimated 800,000 people, mostly Jews, were murdered in the gas chambers at 
Treblinka, which was only one of six death camps the Nazis established in Eastern Europe as part of 
"The Final Solution." HILBERG, supra note 2, at 555-635; see generally L. DAWIDOWICZ, THE WAR 
AGAINST THE JEWS, 1933-1945 (1975). 
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curement offense alone. 41 Fedorenko indicates that a denaturalization case may 
be litigated successfully against an alleged Nazi persecutor on the basis of 
illegal procurement without pointing to a specific instance of misrepre-
sentation or concealment.42 The government can prove illegal procurement 
through evidence of the defendant's conduct prior to either his naturalization 
or his arrival in the United States,43 By showing the defendant's personal in-
volvement with Nazi persecution, the government can prove that the defendant 
was ineligible for a visa under the law which existed at the time of entry. Because 
of the illegal entry, the government can prove that the later grant of citizenship 
41 Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 515. The Court based its decision on the illegal procurement ground alone, 
despite the fact that the parties had agreed that the issue involved was the proper standard of 
materiality to be applied in considering the ground of misrepresentation. !d. at 508-10. See also Note, 
Denaturalization of Nazi War Criminals After Fedorenko, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 169, 178-80 (1982). 
The Court did not find it necessary to rule on the issue of materiality for two reasons. First, it found 
that the case rested upon the lawfulness of the initial entry, and not on false statements in the 
application for naturalization. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 509-10. Second, the Court concluded that, as a 
matter of law, the true facts about the defendant's past history would have made him ineligible for a 
visa under the DPA. Id. 
Courts have differed as to the proper standard of materiality applicable to false statements made in 
the naturalization process. Compare United States v. Rossi, 299 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1962) (a concealed 
fact is material only if disclosure would have led to a refusal to issue a visa) with Kassab v. INS, 364 
F.2d 806 (6th Cir. 1966) (it is enough if revealed facts might have led to discovery of additional facts 
justifying the refusal of a visa). The disagreement stems from the two tests enunciated in Chaunt v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 350, 355 (1960). The Chaunt court held that a misstatement is material if 
either knowledge of the facts would have warranted denial of citizenship, or "disclosure might have 
been useful in an investigation possibly leading to the discovery of other facts warranting denial of 
citizenship." Id. The confusion stems from the Chaunt court's wording of the second prong: does 
materiality have to come from the concealed facts themselves, or can it also come from other facts 
obtained through additional discovery, which is prompted by disclosure of these concealed facts? See 
Fedorenko v. United States, 597 F.2d 946, 951 (5th Cir. 1979), afl'd on other grounds, 449 U.S. 490 
(1981) (the circuit court of appeals adopted the latter view stating that otherwise an applicant would 
be encouraged to lie, and the government would have to investigate his past and prove the ultimate 
facts warranting his ineligibility, to succeed on this ground in a denaturalization action). The inconsis-
tency continues in the lower courts because this debate has not yet been resolved by the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Maikovskis v. INS, 773 F.2d 435, 441-42 (2d Cir. 1985). See, e.g., United States v. Sheshtawy, 
714 F.2d 1038, 1039-40 (10th Cir. 1983); Koziy, 540 F. Supp. at 36. 
42 Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d at 497 (since disclosure of the true facts would have made former Nazi 
persecutor ineligible for citizenship, court followed Fedorenko and held there was no need to resolve 
whether defendant's misrepresentations were material under second prong of Chaunt). The misrepre-
sentation offense requires the government to point to a specific statement that shows the defendant's 
misrepresentation or willful concealment. United States v. Osidach, 513 F. Supp. 51, 103 (E.D.Pa. 
1981) (court found the government's theory on the concealment and misrepresentation ground in a 
denaturalization case, against a former Ukranian commander who took part in the extermination of 
Jews in Rawa-Ruska, to be legally and factually without merit, because the form utilized by the INS 
at the time of the defendant's visa application did not include any specific questions regarding his 
activity during World War II. The defendant was, nevertheless, denaturalized on the grounds of 
illegal procurement). See also supra note 41. 
43 See 8 U.s.C. § 1427(e). 
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was procured illegally.44 Illegal procurement can also be shown by proving the 
lack of good moral character, a statutory prerequisite to obtaining naturaliza-
tion.45 
Despite the continued use of the fraudulent procurement ground in dena-
turalization actions against alleged Nazi persecutors, the illegal procurement 
ground is better suited to establishing the feasibility of consolidating denatur-
alization and deportation charges against such defendants.46 An individual who 
is denaturalized for having fraudulently obtained citizenship may not necessarily 
be deportable, since the individual may have entered the United States legally.47 
On the other hand, an individual denaturalized on grounds of illegal procure-
ment whose past history reveals a lack of eligibilty to enter the United States 
(such as a former Nazi persecutor), can face deportation charges on grounds 
of excludability.48 In addition, litigation on an illegal procurement theory will 
better elicit the facts needed to prove the individual's deportability.49 
Fedorenko also made the illegal procurement means of proof more effective 
for prosecuting Nazi persecutors. The Court upheld the Eleventh Circuit's 
ruling that a district court judge has no equitable power to take subsequent 
good behavior into account, or to overlook the failure to meet all the required 
conditions precedent, and thereby not revoke the grant of citizenship.50 The 
Court recognized that Congress did not grant to the district courts the discretion 
to pardon an individual who has obtained his citizenship illegally and is now 
facing denaturalization. 51 
44 See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a). See also supra notes 22-23. 
45 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3). 
46 See supra note 42. In addition to having to pinpoint a specific instance of concealment, the 
government also has to show that the defendant intentionally engaged in deception, in order to 
establish misrepresentation under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a). See Maisenberg v. United States, 356 U.S. 670, 
673 (1958). A defendant's past involvement with Nazi persecution can also serve as a basis for 
revocation based on the fraudulent procurement prong of § 1451(a). United States v. Palciauskas,. 734 
F.2d 625, 628 (11th Cir. 1984) (defendant's certificate of naturalization was revoked and his U.S. 
citizenship was cancelled under § 1451(a) where he misrepresented on his visa application that he was 
a clerk in a food camp during the Nazi occupation of Lithuania, since the evidence showed that he 
actually assisted with Nazi persecution of the local Jewish population as mayor of his city). 
47 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 32, § 20.6, at 37. 
48 See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(l) (makes deportable aliens who were excludable from entering the United 
States); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(33) (makes Nazi persecutors excludable at entry); 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(19) 
(makes Nazi persecutors deportable). 
49 See supra note 16. 
50 Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 517. The district court has no discretion to utilize its equitable powers if 
the government proves that the defendant obtained his certificate of naturalization illegally or fraud-
ulently. [d. The district court cannot ignore, excuse, or overlook such facts and uphold the grant as 
valid. /d. Where the defendant has failed to comply with all the preconditions, the court must annul 
the grant upon adequate proof. [d. 
51 [d. See also H.R. REP. No. 1086, supra note 38, at 2983. 
1986] DEPORTATION PROCEDURES 373 
C. Procedure 
A U.S. attorney Initiates a denaturalization case pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 14S1(a).52 In addition, OSI may also investigate and initiate actions against 
alleged former Nazi persecutors.53 The suit is adjudicated as a civil case in a 
federal district court.54 The denaturalization action has been considered a suit 
in equity. 55 Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Fedorenko, that the 
district court has no equitable discretion "to excuse illegal or fraudulent pro-
curement of citizenship."56 A denaturalization trial also adheres to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence, as do all civil trials in a federal district 
court.57 
An explicit procedural protection provided by Congress in 8 U.S.C. § 14S1(a) 
is the requirement of filing an affidavit showing good cause in order to com-
mence the denaturalization suit.58 The affidavit serves to protect the naturalized 
citizen by requiring the government to show that a prima facie evidentiary basis 
for the suit exists.59 The affidavit must disclose the evidence from which the 
government concluded that denaturalization proceedings are warranted, so that 
the judge may detect any reckless categorization or noncritical selection of 
defendants for such action.60 Failure to file this required document, which is 
separate from the complaint, will subject the suit to dismissal.61 A defendant in 
a denaturalization case may similarly protect himself through the liberal discov-
ery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.62 
Although a denaturalization suit may be brought in any naturalization court,63 
which includes both state and federal courts, in practice the suit is always filed 
in a U.S. district court.64 The federal district court in which the suit is com-
menced has jurisdiction to revoke the certificate of naturalization even when 
52 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) . 
.. See sujrra note I. Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 0.55(f) (1985), all litigation under immigration and 
nationality laws, including any civil actions against alleged Nazi persecutors, is handled by OSl through 
the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division within the Department of Justice. See GORDON 
& ROSENFIELD, sujrra note 32, § 20.5(b)(3), at 27. 
54 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a). See GoRDON & ROSENFIELD, sujrra note 32, § 20.5, at 24-24.1. 
55 Luria, 231 U.S. at 27-28; GORDON & ROSENFIELD, sujrra note 32, § 20.5, at 24. 
56 Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 517. 
57 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, sujrra note 32, §§ 20.5a, 20.5c(5) & (6), at 24-32. 
58 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a). See also Petition of DeRoma, 603 F. Supp. 127, 131 (D.N.J. 1985). 
59 United States v. Zucca, 351 U.S. 91, 98-100 (1956). 
60 United States v. Minerach, 250 F.2d 721, 725-26 (7th Cir. 1957); DeRoma, 603 F. Supp. at 132. 
61 Costello, 365 U.S. at 284. 
62 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. 
63 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1421 (1982), which grants jurisdiction to naturalize upon 
the following courts: U.S. district courts, state and territorial courts of record. These courts have 
jurisdiction to naturalize only persons who reside within the specific jurisdiction of the court. [d. 
64 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, sujrra note 32, § 20.5c, at 29. 
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the original decree was issued by another naturalization court.55 The denatur-
alization action is filed in the judicial district where the naturalized individual 
resides at the time the suit is filed. 66 
As with all other civil suits, process must be served personally on the defen-
dant. If the defendant is not in either the United States or the judicial district 
in which he last resided, he can be served by publication or by any manner 
provided by the laws of the state where the suit is brought.57 The denaturali-
zation decree will not be valid unless service of process was made in conformity 
with the law.68 
The trial is the same as in all civil litigation; however, because it is a suit in 
equity, the case is not heard by a jury.59 Defendants in denaturalization suits 
frequently move for the right to a jury trial. They argue that the proceeding is 
sufficiently criminal in nature to require a jury verdict, but all such arguments 
have been unsuccessfuPo The defendant may be compelled to testify unless he 
has a recognizable claim of privilege against self-incrimination.?l Since it is a 
65 [d. See generally United States v. Ness, 245 U.S. 319 (1917). 
668 U.S.C. § 1451(a). 
67 8 U.S.C. § 1451(b). See aLIO GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 32, § 20.5c(4), at 31. 
68 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 32, § 20.5c(4), at 31. See also United States v. Cardillo, 135 F. 
Supp. 798, 799 (W.D.Pa. 1955). 
69 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 32, § 20.5d(l), at 33. A denaturalization case includes pretrial 
discovery, see, e.g., United States v. Klimavicius, 620 F. Supp. 667, 668 (D.C. Me. 1985), and the option 
of filing a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. See Dercacz, 530 F. Supp. at 
1349 n.1. It can also include the entry of a default judgment against a defendant, upon motion for 
sanctions for failure to comply with a discovery order, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b) & (d). See 
United States v. Theodorovich, 102 F.R.D. 587, 588 (D.D.C. 1984). The Supreme Court, in Luria, 
held that the defendant does not have a right to a jury trial in a denaturalization case. Luria, 231 U.S. 
at 27-28. See also United States v. Schellong, 717 F.2d 329, 336 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 
1002 (1984); United States v. Klimavicius, 613 F. Supp. 1222, 1223 (D.C.Me. 1985) (neither due 
process nor the sixth amendment require a jury trial in a denaturalization proceeding). 
70 See, e.g., Luria, 231 U.S. at 27-28; United States v. Walus, 453 F. Supp. 699, 702-03 (N.D.Ill. 
1978), rev'd on other grounds, 616 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1979). See generally Denaturalization and the Right to 
Jury Trial, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46 (1980). Although a jury trial could expedite the adjudi-
cation of Nazi persecution cases since a jury verdict can be rendered much sooner than a determination 
by a judge, there are two disadvantages to trial by jury. First, the defendant would have to be afforded 
a greater scope of privilege against self-incrimination and, conceivably, even the right to refuse to take 
the stand, since a greater potential for prejudice would attach to a defendant's refusal to respond to 
specific questions in front of a jury, instead of in front of a judge. See United States v. Mades, 247 
F.2d 378, 381 (2d Cir. 1957). Second, unlike a decision by a judge, a jury verdict does not include a 
written opinion, and this could therefore preclude the existing wide scope of review allowed on appeal 
in the denaturalization cases, particularly if the record in the lower court was unclear or sparse. See 
infra text accompanying notes 73-75. 
71 Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154-55 (1958). In a recent Nazi denaturalization case, a 
limited fifth amendment privilege was recognized. United States v. Trucis, 89 F.R.D. 671, 673-74 
(E.D.Pa. 1981). This privilege extends to questions which pose a real threat of incrimination stemming 
from a defendant's alleged participation in Nazi persecution during World War II, because a defen-
dant's responses may be used by a foreign government for possible foreign prosecution if the defendant 
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civil trial, the defendant's refusal to testify may be noted and thus subject to 
adverse inferences.72 
The denaturalization judgment by the district court, like all judgments in a 
civil proceeding, may be appealed by either side to the circuit court of appeals, 
and subsequently, if certiorari is granted, to the U.S. Supreme Court.73 On 
appeal, extensive review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law is per-
mitted by the court, since "[t]he issue in these cases is so important to the liberty 
of the citizen that the weight normally given ... findings of ... lower courts 
does not preclude [their reconsideration]."74 Accordingly, district court judges 
give considerable detail to their findings of fact and conclusions of law.75 
D. Proof 
The burden of proof which must be shouldered by the governmeiit in making 
its case is an added procedural protection for the defendant, and the most 
unique aspect of the denaturalization suit. In Schneiderman v. United States,76 the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that naturalized citizenship can be revoked only upon 
the standard of proof of clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence.77 The 
Court decided that this burden, higher than the preponderance of evidence 
standard normally required in a civil proceeding, was necessary in a denatur-
alization suit because of the potentially grave outcome-the loss of U.S. citizen-
ship.78 The government's burden of proof must leave no doubt that citizenship 
had not been granted in accordance with the strict legal preconditions.79 
A consequence of this high burden of proof has been administrative reluct-
ance to bring denaturalization suits, except in the most flagrant cases.80 The 
were to be deported. [d. The Trucis court denied the existence of any privilege as to questions 
concerning the defendant's identity and all other matters pertaining to his entry and subsequent 
naturalization. [d. at 674. See also Klimavicius, 620 F. Supp. at 667 (defendant failed to establish the 
threat of foreign prosecution substantial enough to justify his invocation of the fifth amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination). 
72 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 32, § 20.5d(2), at 34. 
73 [d. § 20.4(5), at 36. See generally Nowak v. United States, 356 U.S. 660 (1957). 
7. Costello, 365 U.S. at 269 (quoting Chaunt, 364 U.S. at 352). See also Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 506 (the 
Supreme Court noted that, "in reviewing denaturalization cases, we have carefully examined the 
record ourselves"). 
75 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52. 
76 Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943). 
77 [d. at 125. See also Koziy, 540 F. Supp. at 34. 
78 Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 122-23, 125. 
79 Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 675-76 (1944); see also Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 
122-23, 125. The standard does not surpass the beyond a reasonable doubt standard applicable in a 
criminal case. Kairys, 782 F.2d at 1378 n.8. For practical purposes, however, the standard is basically 
the same because the government will not succeed where any doubt exists. 
80 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 32, § 20.3, at 11-12. 
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OSI's cases represent an exception to this trend of infrequent litigation. The 
heightened standard of proof required in these cases has been a formidable, 
yet not insurmountable, challenge in revoking the citizenship of former Nazi 
persecutors. The testimony and evidence necessary to prove the government's 
case is often elusive, since the events in question occured in other countries 
over forty years ago.81 
E. Effect of a Denaturalization Judgment 
A judgment against the defendant in a denaturalization suit renders the grant 
of citi2.<!nship void ab initio.82 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) revocation of citizenship 
is effective from the original date of the certificate of naturalization.83 There-
fore, the judgment of invalidity relates back to the date of the original grant of 
naturalization, making it a nullity. 84 
By divesting the naturalized person of his illegally obtained citizenship status, 
the denaturalization order restores the individual's former status as an alien.85 
One of the prime consequences an alien then faces is amenability to charges of 
deportation if the individual is within a class, as is the denaturalized Nazi 
persecutor, of either excludable or deportable aliens.86 
81 See RYAN, supra note 3, at 340. 
82 johanessen, 225 U.S. at 240-42. 
as 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1451(b) & (h). The order of denaturalization, in effect, 
revokes and vacates the original order granting the defendant U.S. citizenship, and cancels the 
certificate of naturalization, ordering its surrender to the Attorney General. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(h). The 
clerk of the court must send a certified copy of the memorandum decision to the Attorney General, 
whereupon the order is filed with the original court of naturalization. See GORDON & ROSENFIELD, 
supra note 32, § 20.5d, at 36. Denaturalization permanently restrains and enjoins an individual from 
claiming any citizenship rights, privileges, or advantages, under or through any document which 
evidences citizenship. Id. § 20.6, at 37. 
84 johanessen, 225 U.S. at 240-42. Although this nunc pro tunc concept has been used to determine 
the derivative rights of citizenship, Battaglino v. Marshall, 172 F.2d 979, 981-82 (2d Cir. 1949), the 
U.S. Supreme Court has determined that Congress did not intend that the concept apply to the INA's 
provisions of deportation. Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120, 130-32 (1963) (two criminal convictions in 
the United States could not be relied upon to support alien's deportation, both occurring prior to the 
alien's denaturalization, since the statute only permits deportation of those who were aliens at the time 
of their convictions). Cf Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521,531 (1950). The facts in these cases 
can be distinguished from those discussed in this article, since the relation-back theory, see supra text 
accompanying notes 83-84, as utilized against a denaturalized Nazi persecutor, makes the individual 
immediately amenable to deportation for conduct which transpired prior to, and not after, the indi-
vidual's invalid acquisition of citizenship. See, e.g., Squires v. INS, 689 F.2d 1276, 1283 (6th Cir. 1982) 
(Congress expressly designed 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(l) to reflect changes in the law of excludability, 
therefore, there is explicit authority for applying the relation-back concept to effect a deportation of 
an initially excludable alien). 
85 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 32, § 20.6, at 37. 
86 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a); Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149 (1923). See also infra note 89. 
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III. DEPORTATION 
A. Purpose and Use of Procedure 
The government may invoke the sanction of deportation to expel aliens from 
the United States who fall into two basic categories. s7 The first category includes 
those aliens who were excludable at the time of their entry, or who suceeded in 
entering the country without inspection.88 The second class encompasses aliens 
who are deemed to be deportable for a variety of reasons despite an initial legal 
entry. These reasons include violations of temporary immigration status con-
ditions, and certain types of misconduct while in the country.S9 These two 
categories can also be viewed as distinct from each other. One category includes 
acts committed prior to or at the time of entry, and the other includes acts 
committed subsequent to arrival in the United States. 
Congress determines which classes of aliens are excludable and deportable.90 
The Supreme Court has found the power of Congress to prescribe grounds for 
deportation to be exclusive and free from judicial scrutiny because of its political 
nature.91 Although there is no direct constitutional edict by which Congress 
may exercise its power over deportation, the Court has held that such authority 
is inherent in the exercise of national sovereignty and synonymous with ac-
knowledged congressional power to exclude aliens.92 
In 1952, Congress enacted the current deportation statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1251, 
as part of the IN A.93 There are two important aspects to the deportation statute's 
operation which make it possible to bring deportation charges against denatur-
alized or noncitizen former Nazi persecutors living in the United States. First, 
in determining whether aliens are subject to deportation because they are within 
an excludable class, Congress made dispositive the exclusion law which existed 
at the time of entry.94 Therefore, immigration laws that are no longer in effect, 
such as the DPA or RRA, may be used to prove an alien's initial excludability 
at the time of entry, and, thus, the alien's deportability.9s 
87 See GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 32, § 4.1, at 6-8. 
88 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(l) & (2). § 1251(a)(l) includes, by implication, the 33 excludable classes in 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(I)-(33). Once an alien who falls within one or more of the excludable classes enters 
the United States, the alien is deportable. See, e.g., Reid v. INS, 420 U.S. 619, 623 (1975); Santiago v. 
INS, 526 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976). See also infra note 95 and 
accompanying text. 
89 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(3)-(19). 
90 See generally Fong Vue Ting, 149 U.S. at 713-14. 
91 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952). 
92 See Carlson, 342 U.S. at 536. See also Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913); Yamataya v. 
Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86, 97 (1903); Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The 
Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 601 (1889). 
9' See supra note 4. 
94 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(I). 
95Id. Under this section, all current and previous exclusionary provisions are used in determining 
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Second, Congress expressly provided that the grounds included within the 
deportation statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1251, would apply retroactively.96 This retroac-
tive application affected later amendments to 8 U .S.C. § 1251, such as the 
Holtzman Amendment, which included specific provisions for the exclusion and 
deportation of persons who participated in Nazi persecution.97 Federal courts 
have upheld congressional amendments that create such new classes of exclud-
able and deportable aliens.9S The courts' retroactive application of these amend-
ments does not violate either the prohibitions against ex post facto laws or bills 
of attainder, because deportation does not involve a recognized punishment.99 
The courts have consistently deemed deportation not to be a form of punish-
ment but rather a refusal by the federal government to harbor persons it 
considers undesirable. loo In addition, since there is no general statute of limi-
tations to bring a deportation action, an alien, such as a former Nazi persecutor, 
is always amenable to deportation for illegal entry or for any other conduct 
deemed deportable by Congress. IOI 
B. Grounds 
Deportation charges may be brought against an alien who appears to be 
within a legislatively determined class of either originally excludable or specif-
ically deportable aliens. The classes of deportable aliens include those who were 
excludable at the time of their entry, or who entered in violation of any law of 
the United States. 102 Specific laws were in effect at the time Nazi persecutors 
entered the United States under either the DPA or the RRA.lo3 Therefore, 
charges of initial excludability and violation of law at the time of entry may 
provide the basis for deportation. 104 Prior to the enactment of the Holtzman 
an individual's status. GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 32, § 4.7a, at 44-46. Thus, anyone who 
entered the United States in violation of an existing congressional edict may be deported after his 
unlawful entry is discovered. [d. This includes exclusive provisions of laws, such as the DPA or RRA, 
which are no longer in effect. See, e.g., Matter of Fedorenko, supra note 16, in which the defendant 
was charged with violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(l) because he fell within an excludable class at entry 
under § 2 & § 10 of the DPA. 
96 8 U.S.C. § 1251(d). 
97 [d. See, e.g., Artukovic, 693 F.2d at 897, citing Lehmann v. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690 (1957) 
(Congress may establish grounds for deportation that apply retroactively). See also supra note 2. 
98 See, e.g., Artukovic, 693 F.2d at 897 (upholding the constitutionality of the Holtzman Amendment 
and affirming its retroactive application). 
99 Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 314 (1955) (ex post facto clause); Rubio de Cachu v. INS, 568 
F.2d 625, 627-28 (9th Cir. 1977) (bill of attainder clause). See also Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 594. 
100 Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 594, citing Bugajewitz, 228 U.S. at 591 (opinion by Holmes, J.). 
101 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 32, at 5-6 § 4.1(a). See also supra notes 96-98 and accompanying 
text. 
102 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(I) & (2). 
103 See supra notes 4 & 95. 
104 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(l) & (2). 
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Amendment in 1978, the permanent excludable and deportable statutory clas-
sifications within the INA did not contain any specific provision directed at Nazi 
persecutors. !Os Thus, until the Holtzman Amendment in 1978, a statutory loo-
phole existed by which any Nazi persecutor was neither specifically excludable 
nor deportable if he entered the United States after the operative dates of the 
DPA and RRA.106 The Holtzman Amendment added to both classes of aliens, 
those "who ... under the direction or in association with [Nazis and their 
collaborators] ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the per-
secution of any person because of race, religion, national origin or political 
opinion."lo7 The amendment effectively closed the loophole. The retroactive 
application of 8 U.S.c. § 1251(a)(l9) makes any former Nazi persecutor who 
has entered the United States deportable, no matter what exclusive provision 
existed at the time of entry. lOB 
In deportation actions brought against denaturalized Nazi persecutors, stan-
dard OSI charges include first, excludability at entry under applicable sections 
of the INA, DPA or RRA pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1); second, entrance 
in violation of the same sections of these refugee laws pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1251(a)(2); and third, participation in Nazi persecution pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1251(a)(l9).I09 In a deportation proceeding brought against an alleged Nazi 
105 H.R. REP. No. 1452, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., at 8 (1978) [hereinafter cited as House Report 1452], 
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4700, 4707. 
106/d. There were, however, State Department regulations in effect during the 1950's which inter· 
preted 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27) (excludes aliens who seek to enter the United States to engage in activities 
which would be prejudicial to the United States), and § 1182(a)(29) (excludes aliens who would engage 
in various subversive activity after entry) as prohibiting the entry of charged or convicted war criminals, 
and also individuals who had "engaged in conduct contrary to civilization and human decency." 22 
C.F.R. § 42.420) (1953). See also supra note 4. 
107 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(33); 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(19). See also supra note 4. Although the use of the term 
"persecution" was controversial, Congress incorporated the term but declined to give it a specific 
statutory definition. The term was defined in accordance with the administrative and judicial case law 
developed in interpreting other provisions contained in the INA. House Report, supra note 105, at 7-
9. This language has been held not to be unconstitutionally vague. Artukovic, 693 F.2d at 897. Enactment 
of the Holtzman Amendment reestablished a provision which was in the post-World War II refugee 
measures under U.S. immigration law. House Report, supra note 105, at 2-7. 
108 See Maikovskis, 773 F.2d at 446 (a police chief who, on Nazis' orders had his men arrest all 
inhabitants of a village and burn it, has assisted in persecution and his personal motivations are not 
paramount in determination under 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(19»; Laipenieks v. INS, 750 F.2d 1427, 1430 
(9th Cir. 1985) (interpreted § 1251(a)(19) as requiring evidence which establishes that the alien per-
sonally ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of individuals, in order 
to find the alien deportable as a former Nazi persecutor). See also Note, United States Exclusion and 
Deportation of Nazi War Criminals: The Act of October 30, 1978, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. & P. 101, 115-16 
(1980). 
109 See, e.g., Matter of Fedorenko, supra note 16, at 2. See also Matter of Kulle, Interim Decision No. 
3002 (B.l.A. 1985) at 2 (also included in the charge was excludability and deportability based on 8 
U.S.c. § 1182(a)(19) (visa procured by fraud or willful misrepresentation of a material fact) and on 8 
U.s.C. § 1182(a)(20) (no valid immigrant visa); Matter of Linnas, Interim Decision No. 3000 (B.l.A. 
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persecutor who entered the United States without procuring his visa by fraud, 
at a time when no existing law would have excluded him, the charge may consist 
only of an allegation of deportability based on 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(l9).lIo 
C. Procedure 
While Congress determines which classes of aliens may be deported, it entrusts 
the enforcement of these legislative policies to the offices of the executive 
branch.1l1 Specifically, 8 U.S.C. § 1103 empowers the Attorney General to ad-
minister and enforce the immigration laws. 112 In turn, the Attorney General 
has delegated this power to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), 
a surrogate agency of the Department of Justice. ll3 
The statutory provisions concerning the deportation procedure are set forth 
in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b).1I4 Additional provisions regarding the proceeding are 
1985) at 1-2, a/I'd Linnas v. INS, No. 85-4163 (2d. Cir. 1986) (available on Lexis) [hereinafter cited 
as Linnas]. 
liD Laipenieks, 750 F.2d at 1429. Another possible ground of excludability, which has been used 
against Nazi persecutors in deportation proceedings, is proof that the alien procured his visa through 
fraud or willful misrepresentation of a material fact under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(l9). See Matter of 
Laipenieks, 18 I&N Dec. 433, 434 (Interim Decision No. 2849) (B.l.A. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 
Laipenieks, 750 F.2d at 1437. This ground, like the similar ground in a denaturalization action (see 
supra note 41 and accompanying text) requires proof of a specific instance of initial fraud or misre-
presentation. 750 F.2d at 1429. It is subject to the same confusion regarding the standard of materiality, 
since the Chaunt test (see supra note 41) has been held to apply in a deportation proceeding as to the 
materiality of misstatements at the visa application stage. Maikovskis, 773 F.2d at 441. See also GORDON 
& ROSENFIELD, supra note 32, § 4.7c(4), at 58-58.2. 
I II See GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 32, § 4.4, at 24. Any authority the executive branch 
exercises must derive from an explicit statute. Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32,40 (1924). See also Olegario 
v. United States, 629 F.2d 204, 224 (2d Cir. 1980). Congress has traditionally been given wide latitude 
and discretion in carrying out its deportation powers, which have been upheld as a proper use of 
federal power. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 361 (1956). 
112 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (1982). 
113 8 C.F.R. §§ 2.1, 100.2 (1986); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1551 (1982) (establishment of INS). See generally 
United States ex. reI. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950); Patel v. INS, 638 F.2d 1199, 
1201-02 (9th Cir. 1980). 
114 The deportation procedure statute states, in relevant part, that an: 
[Immigration judge] shall conduct proceedings under this section to determine the deporta-
bility of any alien, and shall administer oaths, present and receive evidence, interrogate, 
examine, and cross-examine the alien or witnesses, and, as authorized by the Attorney Gen-
eral, shall make determinations, including orders of deportation. Determination of deporta-
bility in any case shall be made only upon a record made in a proceeding before [an immi-
gration judge], at which the alien shall have reasonable opportunity to be present ... the 
Attorney General shall prescribe ... regulations ... [including] requirements that: 
(I) .the alien shall be given [reasonable] notice ... ; 
(2) the alien shall have the privilege of being represented [by counsel] ... ; 
(3) the alien shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence against him, to 
present evidence in his own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the Govern-
ment; and 
(4) no decision of deportability shall be valid unless it is based upon reasonable, substantial, 
and probative evidence. 
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also established by INS regulations. I IS The procedure itself is initially adjudi-
cated at an administrative hearing before an immigration judge. 116 The immi-
gration judge is neither a judicial officer nor an administrative law judge as 
defined by the Administrative Procedure Act,ll7 but is merely an employee of 
the INS, the agency responsible for investigating and initiating deportation 
cases. IIB The Attorney General is empowered to select immigration judges, who 
preside over specific types of proceedings, namely deportation and exclusion 
hearings. 1l9 The immigration judge is responsible for determining whether an 
administrative finding of deportability is warranted based upon the evidence 
presented. 12D 
The government initiates the proceeding through the issuance of an order 
to show cause. l2l The order must specify, among other items, the statutory 
provisions allegedly violated and the factual allegations upon which the action 
is based. 122 The order requests the respondent to show cause why he should 
not be deported and asks him to appear before an immigration judge for a 
hearing at a designated time and place. 123 
The procedure so prescribed shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining the 
deportability of an alien under this section. 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1982). 
115 8 C.F.R. § 242 (1986) (Proceedings to Determine Deportability of Aliens in the United States: 
Apprehension, Custody, Hearing and Appeal). See also Dept. of Justice, INS Proposed Rules of 
Procedure for Proceedings Before Immigration Judges, Fed. Reg. at 51693 (1985). 
116 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1.1(1), 242.8 (1986). Immigration judges, and the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (B.LA.) (see infra note 137) are under the authority of the Executive Office of 
Immigration Review, which is part of the Department of Justice. 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.0, 3.1 (1986). 
117 Lopez-Telles v. INS, 564 F.2d 1302, 1303-04 (9th Cir. 1977). 
118 Id. See generally LeTourneur v. INS, 538 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1976). The dual role played by the 
immigration judge as both administrative and judicial officer has come under strong criticism by 
commentators and congressional commission. See THE SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND 
REFUGEE POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST, THE FINAL REpORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY at 248-50 (1981) 
(Commission recommends that existing law be amended to create an immigration court under article 
I of the U.S. Constitution). Levinson, A Specialized Court for Immigration Hearings and Appeals, 56 NOTRE 
DAME LAW. 644 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Levinson); Roberts, Proposed: A Specialized Statutory Immi-
gration Court, 18 S.D.I.. REV. 1 (1980). Under the various versions of the proposed Simpson-Mazzolli 
bills, the immigration judge's status would have been upgraded to the more independent administrative 
law judge level. GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 32, § lAi, at 32.6 (1985 Supp.). The legislation, 
however, expired when the 98th Congress adjourned without resolving the differences between the 
two final proposed versions, S. 529, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1984), and H.R. 1510, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1984). Id. Two differing bills which incorporate provisions of these proposed amendments have been 
filed in the 99th Congress. 
119 8 U.S.C. § llOl(b)(4). 
120 8 C.F.R. §§ 242.8,242.14. 
121 Id. at § 242.1. 
122 Id. at § 242.1(a) & (b). 
123 Id. at § 242.1(b). 
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The deportation proceeding is civil rather than criminal in nature. 124 For this 
reason, and because deportation is not considered a form of punishment, the 
Supreme Court has determined that the requirements of procedural due pro-
cess only entitle an alien to a fundamentally fair proceeding in a deportation 
hearing. 125 In applying this lower standard, the Supreme Court has ruled that 
great deference should be given to executive authority to interpret and imple-
ment deportation statutes. 126 The statutes and regulations include such protec-
tions as adequate notice, the opportunity to obtain counsel, the opportunity to 
present evidence and to cross-examine witnesses, and the right to have a pref-
erence regarding the country to which the alien would be deported. 127 Finally, 
the rules of evidence are not applicable in the hearing, and any type of evidence 
is admissible if it is deemed material and" relevant. 128 
The deportation hearing actually consists of a series of hearings conducted 
within a certain time period, which can last for many months. 129 In the depor-
tation proceeding, the alien is permitted to apply for certain categories of 
discretionary relief prior to or during the hearing. 130 In this way, humanitarian 
124 Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 594-95. See also Bugajewitz, 228 U.S. at 591. 
125 japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. at 100-02. See also Galvan, 347 U.S. at 530-32. 
126 INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 12, 19 (1982); see generally INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 145-46 (1981). 
These two recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions affirm that the proper way to determine whether a 
defendant has been afforded due process in a deportation proceeding is to question whether statutory 
requirements were met, rather than to judicially impose due process standards. Miranda, 459 U.S. at 
19; Wang, 450 U.S. at 145. See also Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49-50 (1950); japanese 
Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. at 100-02. 
127 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b), 1253(a); 8 C.F.R. §§ 242.10, 242.16(a), 242.17(c). 
128 8 C.F.R. 242.14. See also Bilokumsky, 263 U.S. at 157. 
129 See RYAN, supra note 3, at 50-51. 
'". See 8 C.F.R. §§ 242.17; 244 (1986). The forms of relief available through the Attorney General's 
discretionary power include: withholding of deportation on the basis that such alien's life or freedom 
would be threatened in a country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group or political opinions. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(I). When such a request for asylum is made after 
initiation of a deportation hearing, it is considered under § 1253(h). 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) (1986). If the 
alien meets the criteria under § 1253(h), the Attorney General is prohibited from deporting the alien, 
despite his discretionary power. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 749 F.2d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1984). 
Certain aliens may also be eligible for asylum after a deportation hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 208.10 & 11 
(1986). The Attorney General has the discretion to grant or deny asylum to any alien who is entitled 
to refugee status, under the Refugee Relief Act of 1980.8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(a); see also infra 
notes 186-90 and acompanying text. An alien deportable as a Nazi persecutor is automatically ineligible 
for refugee status, since the definition of a "refugee" under § 1101(a)(42) specifically excludes anyone 
who has engaged in persecution. See also 8 C.F.R. § 207.3(a) (1986). Suspension.of deportation under 
8 U.S.C. § 1254(a), is another form of statutory discretionary relief, used to ameliorate harsh conse-
quences of deportation for aliens who have been in the United States for a long time. The Attorney 
General has discretion to waive deportation for fraudulent entry in cases where the alien has close 
family ties to a U.S. citizen, or was otherwise admissible except for the fraud. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(f). The 
Attorney General may also choose to permit an alien to depart from the United States voluntarily, in 
order to avoid the customary formal deportation procedures. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e). All of these forms 
of relief do not apply to aliens deportable for participating with Nazi persecution under 8 U.S.C. 
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considerations may be raised and an alien who is deportable may be allowed to 
stay in the United States.[3[ However, Congress excluded Nazi persecutors from 
eligibility for all substantial forms of discretionary relief through both the 1978 
Holtzman Amendment and a subsequent 1981 amendment to the INA.[32 Thus, 
discretionary relief is unavailable to any alien deportable under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1251(a)(l9) who participated in Nazi persecution.[33 Therefore, to prevent 
consideration of any discretionary relief in a deportation action against an 
alleged former Nazi persecutor, the charge must include an allegation of de-
portability based on 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(l9).[34 Discretionary relief is precluded 
only upon an initial finding of involvement with Nazi persecution between 1933 
and 1945.[35 
An alien, who an immigration judge orders deported, has several avenues of 
appeai.[36 First, the alien must appeal, within ten days of the decision, to the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), a quasi-judicial agency which is under 
the authority of the Attorney Generai.[37 If the BIA upholds the finding of 
deportability, then the deportation order becomes administratively final and the 
alien may seek judicial review.[38 The procedure for judicial review of final 
§ 1251(a)(l9), pursuant to the Holtzman Amendment and subsequent 1981 Amendment. Maikovskis, 
773 F.2d at 442-43. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(f)(I)(A), 1253(h)(I), 1254(a), 1254(e). 
In addition, some aliens are also entitled to apply for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). 
Since eligibilty for this form of relief precludes any alien who was excludable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a), 
Nazi persecutors are not entitled to apply. 
['I Consideration of a request for discretionary relief involves a two-step process. First, the immi-
gration judge decides whether the alien is, in fact, eligible for the particular form of relief. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 242.17(e). Next, even if the alien is eligible, the judge, exercises the discretionary power of the 
Attorney General, and decides whether such relief should be granted or denied. Patel, 638 F.2d at 
1205-06. But see supra note 130 (mandatory relief for asylum requests under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h». 
J32 See 8 U.S.c. §§ 1251(f)(I)(A), 1253(h), 1254(a), 1254(e). The original 1978 Holtzman Amend-
ment, see supra note 2, made aliens who participated in persecution under the Nazi regime excludable, 
deportable, and ineligible for waiver of deportation for fraudulent entry, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(f)(I)(A); 
withholding of deportation, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(l), and voluntary departure, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e). See 
generally Artukovic, 693 F.2d at 897. See also Matter of Kulle, supra note 109, at 23. In a subsequent 
1981 Amendment, Pub. L. No. 116, § 18(e), 95 Stat. 1611, Congress also made individuals who are 
deportable for Nazi persecution ineligible for suspension of deportation. 8 U.s.C. § 1254(a)(I). See 
Matter of Laipenieks, supra note 110, at 466; Matter of Fedorenko, supra note 16, at 18-19. 
m Maikovskis, 773 F.2d at 442-43.8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(f)(I)(A), 1253(h)(l) & (2), 1254(a), 1254(e). See 
generally Matter of Fedorenko, supra note 16, at 18-19. 
1'4 See Matter of Kulle, supra note 109, at 23. 
135 See Matter of Fedorenko, supra note 16, at 18-19. 
1'68 U.S.C. § 1105a, 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.I(d)(2), 242.21. An alien can also file a motion to reopen or 
reconsider the case. 8 C.F.R. § 242.2. See also GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 32, § 5.13a, at 160-
64. If such a motion is granted, a stay of execution of the pending deportation order is not automatically 
granted, and thus the alien must make a separate motion for a stay. 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.6, 242.22, 243.4. 
J37 See 8 C.F.R. § 242.21. Because the BIA exists pursuant to regulation, its lack of independence 
has been criticized as prohibiting its ability to make impartial and fair decisions. Levinson, supra note 
118, at 649-51. 
138 See 8 C.F.R. § 3.I(d)(2). For the court of appeals to have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1105a, the 
alien must have exhausted all administrative remedies available. Cheng Yong Chew v. Boyd, 309 F.2d 
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orders of deportation is provided by 8 U.S.C. § l105a(a), which directs the 
circuit courts of appeals to hear all such appeals. 139 An alien has six months 
from a final administrative determination of deportation to appeal for judicial 
review. 140 The findings of fact are conclusive if they are found to be supported 
by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record in its entirety. 141 
Overall, an appeals court's review is limited to a consideration of whether the 
administrative proceeding comported with the requirements of due process. 142 
The court of appeals can only pass upon issues raised in the hearing and which 
are part of the administrative record. 143 Since neither the immigration judge 
nor the BIA have the authority to pass upon the constitutionality of the appli-
cable statutes and regulations, this exclusive review by the circuit court of 
appeals affords the alien the means of challenging these provisions. 144 The 
decision rendered by the circuit court of appeals, as with all other decisions, 
may be appealed to the Supreme Court, if certiorari is granted. 145 
857.861 (9th Cir. 1962). The BIA decision is deemed administratively final, except in instances where 
a case is referred to the Attorney General. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(2). The BIA can refer cases for this type 
of review, if directed to by the Attorney General, decided to by the Chairman or a majority of the 
BIA, or upon such a request by the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 3.1(h)(I). 
139 See 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a), added by 1961 Amendment to the INA, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 5(a), 75 
Stat. 651: "The procedure ... shall apply to, and shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for, the 
judicial review of all final orders of deportation, heretofore or hereafter made against aliens within 
the United States pursuant to administrative proceedings under [8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)]." 8 U.S.C. 
§ 11 05a(a). This jurisdictional statute is intended to prescribe exclusively and regulate a portion of the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts. Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206, 212 (1968). The purpose 
behind its enactment was to "create a single, separate, statutory form of judicial review of administrative 
orders for the deportation ... of aliens from the United States .... " HOUSE REPORT No. 1086, supra 
note 38, at 2966. Congress sought to expedite the deportation process through this device of direct 
petition to the courts of appeals in order to prevent "successive dilatory appeals to various federal 
courts .... " Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 226 (1963). 
While § 1105a withdrew from the district courts jurisdiction to review final orders of deportation 
entered during an 8 U.S.C. § 1252 proceeding, the broad grant of jurisdiction contained in 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1329 is not otherwise circumscribed by the exclusive provision over deportation. Nasan v. INS, 449 
F. Supp. 244 (D.C. Ill. 1978). See also Acosta v. Gaffney, 558 F.2d 1153, 1155-56 (3d Cir. 1977) (district 
courts still have jurisdiction to review denial by the INS of a stay of a deportation order). Also, the 
right of review by a district court through a writ of habeas corpus for those aliens held in custody 
who have been ordered deported, was preserved by this 1961 amendment to the INA. See 8 U.S.C 
§ 1105a(b). But where the issue of deportability is in question, exclusive appellate jurisdiction rests 
with the circuit courts of appeals, even if the alien is raising the constitutionality of a statute itself. 
Daneshivar v. Chauvin, 644 F.2d 1248, 1250-51 (8th Cir. 1981). 
140 8 U .S.C. § 1105a(a)(l). 
141 Maikovskis, 773 F.2d at 446. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4). 
142 Biggin v. INS, 479 F.2d 569, 572 (3d Cir. 1973). 
143 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4). 
144 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 32, § 5.106, at 118.4-20. 
145 28 U .S.C. § 2350 (1982). 
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There is one notable exception to this process of judicial review, which occurs 
when the alien on appeal asserts a nonfrivolous claim of citizenship. 146 Congress 
has provided for a de novo hearing in the appropriate district court where such 
a claim is made. 147 This provision followed the Supreme Court's decision in Ng 
Fung Ho v. White,148 in which the Court ruled that the fifth amendment's guar-
antee of due process requires all citizenship claims to be subject to judicial 
determination.149 
D. Proof 
At the initial administrative hearing, two basic elements form the prima facie 
case of an individual's deportability from the United States. The government's 
evidence must prove that first, the individual in question is in fact an alien, and 
second, that the individual falls within one or more categories of deportability. 150 
The standard of proof which the government must meet in a deportation 
hearing is the same burden as that in a denaturalization trial: clear, unequivocal, 
and convincing evidence. 151 Despite this heightened burden on the government, 
there is a statutory burden on the respondent to show the time, place, and 
manner of entry into the United States. 152 This burden creates a statutory 
presumption of deportability in cases involving an alleged illegal entry, where 
the government proves that the individual is an alien and where the individual 
is either unable or unwilling to offer evidence or testify regarding entry.153 
When this occurs, the individual is statutorily presumed to be present unlawfully 
in the United States and may be ordered deported on this finding alone. 154 
E. Effect of the Deportation-Order 
Once a final order of deportation has become administratively final, has 
withstood all appellate challenges to its validity, and no discretionary relief has 
146 Agosto v. INS, 436 U.S. 748. 752-54 (1978). 
147 8 U.S.C. § 1l05a(a)(5). 
148 Ng Fung Ho v. White. 259 U.S. 276 (1922). 
149 [d. at 284-85. See also Kessler v. Strecker. 307 U.S. 22. 34-35 (1939); Bilokumsky. 263 U.S. at 152-
53; 8 U.S.C. § 1l05a(a)(5). 
150 GORDON & ROSENFIELD. supra note 32. § 5. lOb. at 118.4-23. 
151 Woodby v. INS. 385 U.S. 276 (1966). 
152 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (1982). 
153 See Iran v. INS. 656 F.2d 469. 472 (9th Cir. 1981) (presumption applies only in cases where 
illegal entry is at issue); Navia·Duran V. INS. 568 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1977) (presumption does not 
operate until the INS makes out a prima facie case). 
154 Tejeda.Mata V. INS. 626 F.2d 721. 725 (9th Cir. 1980). cert. denied. 102 S.Ct. 2280 (1982); see also 
Cabral-Avila V. INS. 589 F.2d 957. 959 (9th Cir. 1978). cert. denied 440 U.S. 920 (1979). This pre-
sumption of deportability does not deprive the alien of any fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. Smith V. INS. 585 F.2d 600. 602 (3d Cir. 1978). unless the testimony is used against the 
alien in a subsequent criminal proceeding. Chavez-Raya V. INS. 519 F.2d 397. 401 (7th Cir. 1975). 
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been granted, the actual deportation of the alien must be carried out. 155 Al-
though the question of destination arises during the initial hearing, the actual 
implementation of the deportation order is handled outside the adjudicative 
process. 156 
The actual destination of a deported alien is a consideration which is second-
ary to the initial question of his deportability. The Attorney General is given 
six months from either the final order of deportation, or from the date of the 
final reviewing court's decision, to effect the alien's departure from the United 
States. 157 Congress has provided a specific procedure for the deportation of an 
expelled alien, which provides three series of destination options. 15s First, the 
alien is permitted to designate one country of choice, to which the alien will go 
if the designated country agrees to the plan. 159 If, however, the Attorney General 
concludes that deportation to that country "would be prejudicial to the interests 
of the United States," if the alien declines to make a proper designation, or if 
the country refuses to accept the deportee, then the second option is at-
tempted. 160 The second option authorizes the Attorney General to pick the 
country of which the alien is a subject, national, or citizen, provided that this 
country is willing to take the alien into its territory. 161 If this second option 
cannot be implemented, the Attorney General is then authorized to choose any 
of the following countries for designation: the country from which the alien 
last entered the United States, the country from which port the alien embarked 
for the United States, the country in which the alien was born, the country in 
which the alien's birth place is situated when the deportation order is rendered, 
any country in which the alien resided prior to entering the United States, any 
country having sovereignty over the alien's birth place, or any other country 
willing to take in the alien. 162 
155 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c). 
156 See GoRDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 32, § 5.18, at 201. 
157 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c). 
158 See 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a); Matter of Linnas, supra note 109, at 3-4; see generally Wong Kam Cheung 
v. INS, 408 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1969). 
159 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a). In practice this occurs during the hearing. ld. 
160 ld. If the country fails to advise the U.S. Attorney General within three months following an 
initial inquiry, the designation may thereafter be disregarded. ld. See aLso Matter of Linnas, supra note 
109, at 3. 
161 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a); Matter of Linnas, supra note 109, at 3. 
162 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(I)-(7). There is no priority or preference to the order of these choices. ld. See 
Linnas, supra note 109, at 10-12. When no other country but the Soviet Union is willing to accept a 
deportable former Estonian Nazi persecutor into its territory, it may be properly designated as the 
country of deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(7». The State Department had declared that such a 
deportation would not contravene the United States' refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the Soviet 
annexation of Estonia. Linnas, supra note 109, at 10-12. In affirming the BIA's deportation order 
against Linnas to the Soviet Union, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Linnas' assertion 
that such a deportation would violate his rights to due process and equal protection. Linnas, supra note 
109, at 2. 
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The determination of the deportee's destination further delays the actual 
removal of denaturalized Nazi persecutors. The delay occurs because the Nazi 
persecutors have usually surrendered their former citizenship at the time of 
their naturalization in the United States. 163 Thus, after U.S. citizenship is re-
voked, these former Nazi persecutors become stateless persons; as such, no 
country is obligated to take them back. 164 Consequently, in the majority of cases 
the OSI has had to depend on the third option in the statute: finding any 
country which will consent to taking in the deported Nazi persecutor. 165 This 
process is time-consuming, with few possible choices, but nevertheless the OSI 
has succeeded in deporting three Nazi persecutors, two of whom had been 
previously denaturalized. 166 
IV. THE CONSOLIDATED DENATURALIZATION/DEPORTATION PROCEDURE: A 
PROPOSAL 
A. Purpose and Policy 
The U.S. government's policy towards former Nazi persecutors that live in 
the United States is to strip such persons of the privileges of U.S. citizenship 
and residence they obtained iliegally.167 To accomplish this revocation under 
current law, two separate processes of denaturalization and deportation must 
be used, resulting in protracted and duplicative litigation that takes five to seven 
years, at best, to complete. 168 OSI presently has over 300 cases under investi-
gation, many of which will result in legal action. 169 If these Nazi cases are to be 
litigated in an efficient manner, a change in the existing law of denaturalization 
and deportation is required. One way to accomplish this change is for Congress 
to amend the INA to provide for a consolidated denaturalization/deportation 
163 See RYAN, supra note 3, at 260-61; 343-44. 
16. !d. 
165 !d. See also, e.g., Linnas, supra note 109, at 10-12. 
166 Two denaturalized Nazi persecutors have been deported, including Feodor Fedorenko (to the 
U.S.S.R.). See supra note 16 and 32; see also Ex-Nazi in United States Since 1949, is Deported to Soviet 
Union, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1984, at 12, col. 3. The other denaturalized deportee is Viorel Trifa (to 
Portugal). See Deported Bishop Flies to Portugal, N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1984, at I, col. I. A third Nazi 
persecutor who was never naturalized, Hans Lipschis, was deported in 1983 to West Germany, where 
he was a citizen. See OSI, Digest of Cases, supra note 9, at 47. Two other OSI defendants, Andrija 
Artukovic and John Demjanjuk, were finally removed from the United States through requests for 
their extradition by Yugoslavia and Israel, respectively. U.S. Extradites Croat to Yugoslavia, N.Y. Times, 
Feb. 13, 1986, at 3, col. I.; Nazi Suspect in Israel to Face Trial, N.Y. Times, Mar. I, 1986, at I, col. I. 
See supra note 18; Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 576 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 
1198 (1986). Both had been formerly subject to orders of deportation. See supra note 18; Demjanjuk, 
776 F.2d at 573. 
167 See supra note 7. 
168 See supra notes 22-166 and accompanying text. 
169 See supra notes 9-14. 
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procedure. Such an amendment would not be outside Congress' proper scope 
of authority. 
Congress' power over the area of immigration is extensive and the Court has 
upheld its ability to change the statutorily mandated procedures within this 
area, including denaturalization and deportation. 170 In the past, Congress has 
authorized judicial hearings for specific types of deportation cases.l7l Therefore, 
the legislature has the power to create a statutory exception to the executive 
branch's general grant of authority over deportation without violating any 
separation of powers principle. 172 
The purpose and ultimate goal of consolidating the denaturalization and 
deportation processes would be to eliminate unnecessary duplication and 
thereby shorten the duration of the entire process into a more reasonable time 
frame, without denying a defendant any constitutionally required procedural 
protections. 
B. Application of the Consolidated Procedure to Nazi Persecutors 
In making the consolidated procedure applicable to OSI's cases against nat-
uralized U.S. citizens, alleged to be former Nazi persecutors, Congress would 
170 See, e.g., Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792; Galvan, 347 U.S. at 530-32; Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272, 
275 (1912); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892); Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 
964-65 (11th Cir. 1984); Matter of Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439, 1442-43 (5th Cir. 1983). See also supra 
notes 30 and 91 and accompanying text. 
171 United States v. Woojan (Chinese Exclusion Case), 245 U.S. 552, 556 (1918) (maintained the 
validity of a statute which authorized a judicial proceeding instead of an administrative determination 
for the deportation of Chinese laborers, whose immigration had been suspended by the Chinese 
Exclusion Laws, Act of September 13, 1888, § 13, 25 Stat. 476, 479). 
172 See generally id. Although the current deportation statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b), states that "[t]he 
procedure so prescribed shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining the deportablility 
of an alien under this section," this is mandated by congressional policy, and not by any constitutional 
principle. In fact the legislative history behind the statutory provision for a specific procedure dem-
onstrates it "was meant to exclude the application of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)." 
Marcello, 349 U.S. at 309. See H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 60, 63 (1952), reprinted in 1952 
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1653, 1710-13. Congress provided for an exclusive procedure in order 
to make clear that deportation was not governed by the requirements of the APA. Id. Congress, 
therefore, has the authority to enact a consolidated denaturalization/deportation procedure applicable 
to Nazi persecutors, without violating the spirit and intent of the specific procedural directive. See id. 
Based on the exclusive statutory provision mentioned above, courts have ruled that the federal 
judiciary is without any decision-making power over individuals subject to deportation, and therefore 
may not, sua sponte, order deportation. Lawrence v. United States, 441 F. Supp. 684, 685 (W.D.Tenn. 
1977); United States V. Castillo-Burgos, 501 F.2d 217, 219-20 (9th Cir. 1974). Such exclusive admin-
istrative jurisdiction possessed by the executive branch is a creation of Congress, and not a result of 
any separation of power principle. Thus, Congress has the power over immigration proceedings to 
make an exception to executive control of deportation proceedings. Woo jan, 245 U.S. at 556. In fact, 
Congress has distinguished deportation cases which involve the question of citizenship from other 
deportation cases, authorizing the involvement of federal district courts in these instances. See 8 U .S.C. 
§ 1105a(a)(5). See also generally Ng Fung Ho, 259 U.S. at 282-85; Exedahtelos V. Fluckey, 54 F.2d 858 
(6th Cir. 1931). 
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have three feasible legislative classes to choose from. The most narrowly drawn 
of these would include only those alleged to be Nazi persecutors, as defined by 
the excludable and deportable categories added by the Holtzman Amend-
ment. 173 As will be discussed, this category is the most appropriate and workable. 
A second possibility would be to make the procedure applicable to naturalized 
citizens alleged to have been involved with the persecution of any person. 
Obviously, this would include Nazi persecutors. The last, and most expansive 
classification would be any naturalized citizen who is later discovered to have 
entered the United States illegally. This category would include all alleged Nazi 
persecutors, since by definition, they were orginally excludable at entry.I74 
1. Nazi Persecutors 
Prior congressional action appears to indicate that the consolidated proceed-
ing should be made applicable only to Nazi persecutors. 175 The enactment of 
the Holtzman Amendment in 1978 highlights the feasibility of this potential 
application. First, the measure incorporated into the INA's excludable and 
deportable classes, individuals who took part in Nazi persecution between 1933 
and 1945. I76 The definition of these individuals is found in 8 U .S.c. 
§§ 1182(a)(33) and 1251(a)(l9). A district court can utilize this definition in the 
consolidated procedure. 
The Holtzman Amendment also precludes Nazi persecutors from being eli-
gible for discretionary relief from deportation. I77 Such legislative action en-
hances the feasibility of this classification for the proposed procedure, since 
there would be no need to provide for any discretionary relief.I78 
The legislative history of the Holtzman Amendment suggests how appropriate 
the consolidated procedure can be when solely applied to alleged Nazi perse-
cutors who have obtained naturalized citizenship. 179 One of the original versions 
of the legislation, and a revised version favorably reported by the Subcommittee 
on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law, would have made exclud-
able and deportable all aliens who engaged in any persecution on the basis of 
race, religion, national origin or political opinion. I8o A later amendment, how-
173 See supra note 2. 
174 See supra notes 3-4.8 U.S.C. § I I 82(a)(33), added in 1978, operates to make any Nazi persecutor 
who entered the United States at any time, excludable through its retroactive application. See supra 
note 97. See also Artukovic, 693 F.2d at 897. 
l75 See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text. 
176Id. 
I77 See supra notes 130 and accompanying text. The subsequent 1981 Amendment further imple-
mented the intent of the 1978 Holtzman Amendment. See id. 
178 See supra notes 130 and accompanying text. 
179 See Note, supra note 108, at 112-14. 
180 H.R. 410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978); House Report 1452, supra note 105, at 2. 
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ever, made on the House floor, and urged by many members of the House 
Judiciary Committee, limited the language of the final version solely to those 
individuals who engaged in persecution under the direction of, or in association 
with, the Nazi government of Germany.181 Such congressional action provides 
a substantial precedential foundation on which to base the limited application 
of the proposed consolidated procedure to only Nazi persecutors. 
The underlying policy of the Holtzman Amendment, that former Nazi per-
secutors deserve specific definition and treatment as a class within the realm of 
immigration and naturalization law, also favors limiting the consolidated pro-
ceeding to these individuals. 182 Acknowledgement of the Nazi persecutor's ac-
tions led Congress to make him excludable and deportable. 183 Therefore, the 
Nazi persecutor should not be able to delay extensively and possibly prevent 
deportation by hiding behind the protection of an invalid grant of citizenship. 
2. All Persecutors 
Despite the fact that the original version of the Holtzman Amendment was 
never passed, Congress could still feasibly make the consolidated procedure 
applicable to any naturalized citizen later discovered to have been involved with 
the persecution of others on the basis of race, religion, national origin or political 
opinion. 184 Congress' enactment of the Refugee Relief Act of 1980,185 included 
provisions which prohibit any individual, who has engaged in persecution, from 
obtaining benefits under the Act. 186 First, the Act defines a "refugee" for pur-
poses of relief eligibility as excluding "any person who ordered, incited, assisted 
or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opin-
ion."187 Since a persecutor would not be eligible to enter the United States as a 
bona fide refugee under the Act, such an individual could be deported as having 
181 See 124 CONGo REc. 31,647 (1978) (remarks of Reps. Eilberg, Holtzman, Kastenmeier). See also 
House Report, supra note 105, at 18. 
182 See 124 CONGo REc. 31,647 (1978). Representative Holtzman's statement in the House debate on 
the pending Bill, points to the uniqueness of the Nazi persecutor: "We cannot as a nation condone 
the presence in the United States of those who have engaged in these unspeakable acts of persecution, 
mass murder, and annihilation under the German Nazi regime." [d. 
183 [d. 
184 See supra note 180. 
185 Refugee Relief Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 212, 94 Stat. 102. 
186 [d. 
187 [d. The new definition incorporated the internationally accepted refugee definition contained in 
the United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6260, 
T.I.A.S. No. 6577, at art. 33(2). Overall, the Act was intended to give "statutory meaning to our 
national commitment to human rights and humanitarian concerns, not reflected in the [INA], as 
amended." S. REp. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 141. 
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been originally excludable upon entry into the United States. 188 The Act also 
adds to the withholding of deportation provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h), an exclu-
sion to eligibility for this form of relief from deportation, if the individual 
participated in any persecution. 189 
These amendments to the INA represent an emerging congressional sensi-
tivity to human rights; application of the consolidated procedure could further 
serve to address these concerns. 190 Nevertheless, these provisions of the Refugee 
Relief Act are only applicable to those aliens who are otherwise eligible for 
refugee status, and not to any other general category of immigrants. 191 The 
prohibitions against persecutors added by the Act only extend to determinations 
regarding refugee status and asylum eligibility; they do not provide new specific 
excludable and deportable categories, as did the Holtzman Amendment. 192 
Therefore, in order to make the consolidated procedure applicable to all alleged 
former persecutors, Congress would also have to amend 8 U.S.c. §§ 1182(a) 
and 1251 (a), adding to both sections the class of persecutors, as defined within 
the Refugee Relief Act of 1980. 193 
3. Excludable Aliens 
Any initially excludable alien, who obtains naturalized U.S. citizenship, is per 
se amenable to both denaturalization and deportation. Therefore, Congress 
could theoretically make the consolidated procedure applicable to this broad 
class of individuals. 194 This categorization would make the procedure applicable 
to naturalized citizens discovered to have allegedly been directly involved with 
Nazi persecution. 195 In fact, under current practice, the government rarely 
188 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(I). See supra note 88. An alien's request for asylum will be denied if it is 
determined that the alien was involved with persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(f)(1) (1986). When such a 
denial is made, the INS is authorized to commence deportation proceedings, if the alien is already in 
the United States. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(f)(4) (1986). 
189 Refugee Relief Act of 1980, supra note 185; 8 U.S.C. § 203(e); 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2). Such relief 
is automatically considered in conjunction with a request for asylum during a deportation proceeding; 
if the alien is eligible under § 1253(h) criteria, this relief becomes mandatory. See supra note 130. 
190 See supra note 187. 
191 S. REP. No. 256. supra note 187. at 4. See 8 C.F.R. § 207.1 (1986). 
192 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42). 1253(h)(2). 
193 See 8 U .s.C. § 1253(h)(2)(A). 
194 By definition. an excludable alien automatically does not meet the naturalization prerequisite of 
lawful prior residence. see supra note 22. and may not meet the precondition of good moral character. 
See supra note 24. Therefore. this alien would have procured a certificate of naturalization illegally. 
and would be subject to denaturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a). See supra notes 38-46 and accom-
panying text. An alien who is excludable at entry is deportable upon discovery within the United 
States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(I); see also supra note 88. 
195 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(33). 1251(a)(I). 1251(a)(19). 1451(a). 
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brings denaturalization actions, and "[a]side from the cases brought by OSI, 
there are virtually no other denaturalization cases in the courts today."196 
Despite this potentially practical application, such a categorization would be 
overbroad. Excludable aliens include a variety of individuals. 197 While many 
classes of excludable aliens are unfit to meet the preconditions for naturalized 
citizenship, there are some who could meet these prerequisites, if they were in 
the United States lawfully. 198 A federal district court has held that the standards 
for exclusion of aliens are not congruent with the standards for naturalization. 199 
The court ruled that a defendant's liability to exclusion and subsequent depor-
tation as an alien excludable at entry under § 1251(a)(I), did not require a 
finding that he was ineligible for naturalization.2°O Therefore, legislation that 
makes the consolidation procedure applicable to all originally excludable aliens 
is unnecessarily broad.201 
C. Procedural Structure of the Consolidated Proceeding 
The most expedient consolidated procedure would consist of a single initial 
trial and a subsequent consolidated appeal, avoiding any repetition in the pro-
cess. The protections of the fifth and fourteenth amendments afforded to all 
U.S. citizens, naturalized and natural-born, require that the issue of validity of 
naturalization be fully litigated before the filing of any deportation charges.202 
Therefore, the proposed consolidated denaturalization and deportation pro-
cedure consists of a bifurcated initial proceeding in federal district court, with 
a consolidated right of appeal to the circuit court of appeals and the Supreme 
Court.203 
The trial would be bifurcated. The first segment of the trial would be a 
denaturalization trial. The second part, which could only be initiated upon an 
order of revocation issued in the prior segment, would involve deportation 
charges.204 Such a procedural structure is necessary to prevent a naturalized 
196 RYAN, supra note 3, at 341. 
197 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)-(33). 
198 In re Brodie, 394 F. Supp. 1208, 1210 (D. Or. 1975). 
199 Id. at 1210-11. 
200 Id. 
201 See also 8 U.S.C. § I I 82 (a)(22) (Congress already has explicitly made "aliens ineligible for citizen-
ship" excludable). Additionally, discretionary relief would have to be available to defendants under 
this application of the consolidated proceeding. See supra notes 130-31. 
202 See infra notes 242-77 and accompanying text (discussion of due process and presumption in 
favor of citizenship). 
20' See supra note II. 
204 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure already grant a district court broad discretion to decide 
how cases on its docket are to be tried. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42. This Rule may be invoked to dispatch the 
business of the court with expedition and efficiency, while maintaining the court's ability to arrive at 
ajust disposition. Stoddard v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 314, 327-28 (C.D. Cal. 1980). 
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citizen from being made to face charges of deportation, before the issue of the 
validity of his naturalization is fully litigated. 205 The first segment of the pro-
cedure would be identical to a current denaturalization triaP06 The government 
would have to succeed on the merits in proving the invalidity of the defendant's 
naturalization before being able to begin the second part of the procedure. 207 
The later portion, initiated by the filing of deportation charges against the 
denaturalized defendant, would vary greatly from the existing administrative 
deportation procedure.208 As with any trial in federal district court, the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence would apply.209 
Although either party would be permitted to introduce any additional evidence 
in the deportation segment, the application of offensive collateral estoppel,210 
which is now utilized by OSI in deportation hearings, would eliminate the 
government's need to do SO.211 The BIA has held that offensive collateral 
See also 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE at 253 § 2381 (1973). Specifically, 
Rule 42(b) gives the district court discretion to decide on its own motion to order separate trials for 
any claims or issues to further convenience, avoid prejudice and promote expedition and economy. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b); Easton v. City of Boulder, Colo., 776 F.2d 1441, 1447 (10th Cir. 1985) (Rule 
42(b) provides broad discretion to trial judges to decide whether to bifurcate trial as to liability and 
damages, and exercise of such discretion is set aside only if clearly abused); Bandai America, Inc. v. 
Bally Midway Mfg. Co., 775 F.2d 70, 74 (3d Cir. 1985) (it was proper for district court to bifurcate 
issues when separate proceedings will be conducive to expedition and economy). The scope of Rule 
42 is extensive and allows federal trial courts to grant bifurcation or consolidation of claims and issues 
in any kind of case. 9 Wright & Miller, supra, at 284 § 2389. Application of Rule 42 has been upheld 
in a denaturalization case. See United States v. Knauer, 149 F.2d 519, 520 (7th Cir. 1945), aff'd, Knauer 
v. United States, 328 U.S. 654 (1946) (trial judge's decision to consolidate pursuant to Rule 42 upheld 
in cases involving denaturalization of Nazi sympathizers). 
205 See infra notes 237-59 and accompanying text. 
206 See supra notes 52-75 and accompanying text. 
207 [d. see also infra notes 243-51 and accompanying text. One possible challenge to this type of 
procedure is that it would be prejudicial to a defendant to have the same judge decide both denatur-
alization and deportation actions. In Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 577, however. it was held that in absence 
of some evidence of actual bias or prejudice from some source other than his prior judicial contact, 
the judge, who decided the denaturalization action against the defendant, was not required to excuse 
himself from ruling on the defendant's extradition proceeding. [d. 
208 See supra notes 114-29 and accompanying text. 
209 See supra text accompanying notes 57-62 and 124-28; see also infra notes 224-36 and accom-
panying text. 
210 Offensive collateral estoppel permits a plaintiff to use a prior determination of an issue by a 
court of competent jurisdiction, that was essential to the past judgment against a defendant, preventing 
its relitigation in the subsequent suit. Parklane Hoisiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-28 (1979). 
The party against which offensive collateral estoppel is asserted must have had an adequate opportunity 
in the previous proceeding to litigate the issue. [d. See also Blonder-Tongue Labortories v. Univ. of Ill. 
Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971). The doctrine serves the interests of judicial finality and certainty, 
and will prevent drawn-out litigation. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 326. 
211 Matter of Fedorenko, supra note 16, at 11; In the Matter of Demjanjuk, U.S. Dept. of Justice, 
File No. A8 237417 (May 1984) [hereinafter cited as Matter of Demjanjukl. The BIA's application of 
offensive collateral estoppel was upheld by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in U.S. v. Demjanjuk, 
767 F.2d 922 (6th Cir. 1985). This opinion, however. was not recommended for full-text publication, 
and is therefore only available on Lexis. See, U.S. v. Demjanjuk, No. 85-3198 (6th Cir. 1985). As 
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estoppel can be used to prevent the relitigation of issues which were determined 
in a prior denaturalization action, successfully brought against a Nazi persecu-
tor.212 Indeed, all relevant facts which concern the deportability of a denatur-
alized Nazi persecutor can be determined from the record of the denaturali-
zation trial. 213 In addition, a Nazi persecutor is not eligible for any form of 
discretionary relief, other than a temporary stay pending appeal. 214 Thus, the 
second segment of the consolidated proceeding could consist of just a motion 
for summary judgment before the trial judge, if there are no outstanding 
genuine issues of material fact. 215 This potential use of offensive collateral 
estoppel points to the feasibility of the proposed procedure, especially when 
solely applicable to alleged former Nazi persecutors.216 
As in any other civil proceeding in federal court, either party would be 
permitted to appeal from a final determination of the district court.217 One of 
two final outcomes could result from the bifurcated trial. There could be a 
verdict for the government on both denaturalization and deportation, or a 
verdict for the defendant on denaturalization, upholding the validity of the 
grant of naturalized citizenship.218 In the later case, if the district court's decision 
were reversed on appeal, the government would be entitled to have the case 
remanded for the deportation portion of the trial.219 The reviewing court would 
utilized in existing deportation hearings, offensive collateral estoppel only shortens the entire process 
by a few days. Interview with Allan A. Ryan, Jr. by Boston College Holocaust/Human Rights Research 
Project Members, December 3, 1984. 
212 Matter of Fedorenko, supra note 16, at II. 
213 Id. 
214 See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text. 
215 Matter of Fedorenko, supra note 16, at II; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. A prior judicial decision, 
effective against a defendant, has been used by the United States, as a plaintiff, in order to preclude 
litigation of issues in a later proceeding, through a motion for summary judgment. United States v. 
Kabinto, 456 F.2d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 1972); Smith v. United States, 369 F.2d 49, 53 (8th Cir. 1966), 
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 1010 (1967). In considering such a motion for summary judgment, a district 
court judge's decision in a prior proceeding is final enough for the application of collateral estoppel 
in the later suit; the possibility of an appeal of the prior decision does not prevent application of the 
doctrine. Sherman v. Jacobson, 247 F. Supp. 261, 268 (S.D.N.V. 1965). See also Southern Pacific 
Communications Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 740 F.2d lOll, 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
216 See supra notes 173-20 I and accompanying text. 
217 See supra note II. 
218 See supra text accompanying notes 202-205. A split verdict in favor of the defendant on dena-
turalization and in favor of the government on deportability, would not occur. This outcome would 
never result because a finding initially in favor of the defendant on the issue of citizenship would 
preclude the commencement of the subsequent deportation phase. Id. A split verdict in favor of the 
government on denaturalization, but in favor of the defendant on deportability, although theoretically 
possible, is not likely to occur in the case of a Nazi persecutor. This is because proof of such an 
individual's illegally procured naturalization also would serve as proof of the individual's deportability. 
Matter of Fedorenko, supra note 16, at II. 
219 See, e.g., United States v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d 946 (lIth Cir. 1979), afl'd on other grounds, 449 
U.S. 490 (1981) (court of appeals reversed the district court's decision in favor of the defendant in 
United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.Fla. 1978». The only difference between a remand 
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have great latitude to consider the district court's findings of fact and conclusions 
of law, as is now required in an appeal from a denaturalizationjudgment.22o 
The actual implementation of the deportation order would not occur until 
after all rights of appeal were exhausted.221 Any applicable forms of discretion-
ary relief could be considered by the trial judge after the consolidated appellate 
process is completed.222 Finally, the procedure now used to determine the 
destination of the deportable alien would not be altered. 223 
D. Procedural Aspects and Protections 
The consolidated proceeding would have to incorporate all the exclusive 
procedural protections already afforded the naturalized defendant in a dena-
turalization action.224 In any case where the government seeks to take away an 
individual's naturalized citizenship, the government must shoulder the higher 
burden. It must prove its case in a judicial trial, with all reasonable doubts 
resolved in favor of the defendant. 225 
The form and service of process would have to meet the present requirements 
of a regular denaturalization action.226 The complaint would have to include all 
the requisite averments concerning the wrongful procurement of citizenship. 
In addition, however, a paragraph should be added which states that if invalidity 
of the defendant's naturalization is proved, then the government will begin the 
second deportation phase of the proceeding against the defendant. 227 In this 
way the defendant would have adequate notice of all the potential allegations 
required to be answered within the consolidated proceeding, without actually 
bringing deportation charges against a U.S. citizen prior to loss of the allegedly 
invalid naturalization.228 
in the consolidated proceeding and what now occurs in a denaturalization case where the government 
takes an appeal, is that both denaturalization and deportation would be initially decided by the district 
court in a single, bifurcated trial. See text accompanying notes 199-204. 
220 See Costello, 365 U.S. at 269. 
221 See 8 C.F.R. § 3.6 (1986). 
222 See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text. Applying the consolidated procedure solely to 
Nazi persecutors would eliminate the need to have the trial judge decide issues concerning discretionary 
relief from deportation. I d. 
223 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a); see also supra notes 158-66 and accompanying text. The defendant could still 
be permitted to make his first choice of destination during the deportation phase of the trial. See supra 
text accompanying notes 127-28. 
224 See text accompanying notes 57-66. 
225 See United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179, 192-93 (19.56) (Black, J. concurring). See also supra 
text accompanying notes 76-81. 
226 See supra text accompanying notes 52-66. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1451(b). 
227 See 8 C.F.R. § 242.I(b). 
228 This method of notice would be sufficient in light of Matter of Fedorenko, supra note 16, in 
which the BIA upheld the application of collateral estoppel to issues in a deportation proceeding 
against a denaturalized Nazi persecutor from findings made in the denaturalization judgment. See 
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The affidavit showing good cause would also playa crucial role in the feasi-
bility of the consolidated denaturalization and deportation procedure.229 In 
addition to the affidavit showing the evidentiary basis for bringing the revoca-
tion action, it would also be used to give the judge enough background to 
determine whether the case warrants the initiation of the special consolidated 
trial. 230 This would serve two important functions. First, it would permit the 
judge to prevent unsubstantiated cases from being brought against naturalized 
citizens, as now occurs in denaturalization actions. Second, it would give the 
judge a preliminary means to ensure that only those cases which Congress 
deems appropriate for adjudication within the consolidated proceeding would 
be considered.231 
The subsequent deportation segment of the bifurcated trial, if commenced, 
would not be procedurally similar to a regular deportation hearing. 232 The 
charges would be brought in federal district court, thus elevating the adjudi-
cation of deportation issues from the administrative level to a judicial deter-
mination.233 Because the deportation segment would be tried judicially, both 
the order to show cause and the statutory burden to show entry would be 
discarded in the consolidated proceeding. 234 The government would be required 
to prove alienage and amenability to specific grounds of deportability by clear, 
unequivocal, and convincing evidence.235 Therefore, no statutory presumption 
of deportation would be available in the consolidated trial against the defendant 
on grounds of illegal entry.236 
V. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PROPOSED CONSOLIDATED DENATURALIZATION AND 
DEPORTATION PROCEDURE 
A. Applicable Standards 
The proposed consolidated denaturalization and deportation proceeding 
would not violate any constitutional principles or deny the defendant any con-
supra notes 211-12. The BIA found that this was fair since both the respondent and the government 
"reasonably could have foreseen that issues raised in the denaturalization proceeding might be raised 
in a subsequent deportation proceeding." Matter of Fedorenko, supra note 16, at 7. Because the parties 
would have been aware that the issue of Nazi persecution was a ground for deportation during the 
denaturalization case, the Board ruled they could reasonably be on notice that the issues raised could 
result in a subsequent deportation proceeding. Id. at 7 n.3. 
229 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a). 
230 See generally id. See also supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text. 
231 See supra notes 173-201 and accompanying text. 
232 See supra text accom panying notes 208-09. 
233 See supra note 69. This would be a non-jury procedure. 
234 See supra text accompanying notes 122-22 & 151-53. 
235 C[ text accompanying notes 149-53. 
236 See supra note 153. 
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stitutional protections.237 The issues to be adjudicated in the consolidated pro-
cedure are the validity of naturalized citizenship and deportability. These issues 
have never warranted the heightened constitutional scrutiny accorded criminal 
prosecutions.238 Additionally, cases which involve denaturalization and depor-
tation fall under Congress' broad power to legislate in the area of immigration 
and naturalization.239 Therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court usually defers to such 
legislative policy and procedure-making when it considers the constitutionality 
of laws enacted in this area.240 The main constitutional issues raised by the 
proposed consolidated proceeding are if such a measure would be inconsistent 
with the citizenship clause of the fourteenth amendment, or if the procedure 
would violate the guarantees of equal protection and due process.241 
B. Citizenship Clause Protection of Naturalized Citizenship 
The fourteenth amendment states, in relevant part, that "[a]1I persons born 
or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States .... "242 This citizenship clause has been interpreted 
by the U.S. Supreme Court as bestowing upon the naturalized citizen all the 
rights and privileges held by the natural-born citizen, including the right not to 
have one's citizenship status involuntarily taken away by the government.243 Yet, 
the Court has acknowledged that grants of naturalized citizenship proved to be 
procured illegally or fraudulently may be revoked involuntarily, without violat-
ing the citizenship clause.244 
The naturalized citizen is afforded the same protections as the natural-born 
citizen against deprivation of this liberty.245 Because there is such a strong 
presumption in favor of citizenship, Congress must provide various procedural 
protections within a denaturalization proceeding, including the higher burden 
of proof and the resolution of all doubts in favor of the naturalized citizen.246 
237 See infra text accompanying notes 242-97. 
238 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 3484-85 (1984); United States v. Kairys, 600 F. Supp. 
1254, 1263-64 (N.D.IlI. 1984). 
239 See supra note 20. 
240 See jean, 727 F.2d at 964-65. 
241 See infra text accompanying notes 242-97. 
242 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. 
243 Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 262, 267-68. See generally Knauer, 328 U.S. at 658. The Afroyim Court noted 
that the original purpose of this clause was to ensure that the newly emancipated slaves would not 
have this right abridged. Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 263-67. The one noted exception to the doctrine of 
equality between native born and naturalized citizens is eligibility for the presidency, for which only 
native born citizens qualify. [d. 
244 Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 267 n.42. See supra note 30. 
245 Minker, 350 U.S. at 187-88 ("where there is doubt it must be resolved in the citizen's favor"). See 
also id. at 197 (Douglas, J. concurring) ("[w]hen we deal with citizenship we tread on sensitive ground"). 
246 See supra text accompanying notes 76-81. 
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A problem raised by the consolidated procedure is whether the potential of 
deportation unconstitutionally infringes upon the naturalized citizen's equal 
rights under the citizenship clause. Any U.S. citizen, whether natural-born or 
naturalized, is not amenable to deportation.247 Congress would impermissibly 
limit a U.S. citizen's freedom of movement if it were to authorize the deportation 
or even the initiation of charges of deportation against a bona fide citizen.248 
Therefore, the bona fide naturalized citizen is not required to answer to de-
portation charges under the consolidated bifurcated trial.249 Only after a final 
judicial determination that the grant of citizenship was wrongfully procured, 
are charges of deportation even filed against the defendant. 250 Thus, only an 
individual who has been returned to his alien status becomes amenable to 
charges of deportation.251 
Although citizenship must be afforded a high degree of protection, a recent 
Supreme Court decision indicates that Congress would not violate the principles 
of the citizenship clause if it enacts the proposed procedure. In Vance v. Terra-
zas,252 the U.S. Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of an expatria-
tion statute.253 Terrazas involved a challenge to 8 U.S.c. § 1481(a)(2), which 
provides that one who takes an oath or allegiance to a foreign state loses his 
U.S. citizenship. The defendant argued that the statute's standard of proof, by 
preponderance of the evidence, and its rebuttable presumption in favor of a 
defendant's voluntariness was a violation of the citizenship clause.254 The Su-
preme Court looked to Congress' broad power to prescribe rules of evidence 
and standards of proof in federal court, when it denied the defendant's consti-
tutional claims.255 The Court held that Congress has express power to enforce 
the fourteenth amendment's citizenship clause and thus has the "power what-
soever to address itself to the manner or means by which fourteenth amendment 
citizenship [natural-born or naturalized] may be relinquished."256 By analogy 
Congress also has the authority to enact the proposed consolidated procedure.257 
In the denaturalization and deportation procedure, all presumptions in favor 
247 Eichenlaub, 338 U.S. at 528. See generally United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 701 
(1898); GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 32, at 26 § 4.56. 
248 See generally Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126-27 (1958). 
249 See supra text accompanying notes 202-207. 
250 [d. 
25! [d. See also Eichenlaub, 338 U.S. at 528; see GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 32, at 37-40 § 20.6. 
252 Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980). 
253 See supra note 28. 
25. Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 255-58. 
255 [d. at 266. See also U.S. CON ST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. 
256 Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 266. 
257 See supra note 30. Under the same power over the federal courts and over the method of 
revocation of naturalized citizenship, Congress could create such a new consolidated procedure without 
infringing upon the established rights of naturalized citizens. 
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of citizenship are maintained.258 Deportation charges are not brought until it 
has been determined that the individual in question does not deserve the 
protections afforded by the fourteenth amendment. 259 
C. Due Process Considerations 
Procedural due process considerations guaranteed by the fifth amendment 
protect the individual against arbitrary government action which results in the 
impairment of life, liberty or property.260 Due process standards applicable to 
U.S. citizens are greater than those afforded to aliens.261 The consolidated 
proceeding would be likely to withstand challenges on this ground because it 
provides all the procedural protections in the existing denaturalization proce-
dure, and enhances the procedural rights afforded to an alien in the regular 
deportation hearing.262 Both naturalized citizens subject to a denaturalization 
proceeding and aliens subject to a deportation hearing are entitled to varying 
amounts of procedural due process.263 Nevertheless, the paramount federal 
power over immigration and naturalization, which includes these two proce-
dures, gives Congress almost unlimited procedural rulemaking power in order 
to further national interests. 264 
In the proposed consolidated proceeding, the key procedural change which 
most threatens due process guarantees, is that an initial determination of de-
portability would be made prior to any appeal on the final determination of the 
revocability of the certificate of naturalization.265 Prior Supreme Court opinions 
and subsequent congressional provisions, however, have created a significant 
analogous situation in which an individual's claim of citizenship may not even 
be considered until a final determination of deportability is made. In Ng Fung 
Ho v. White,266 the Supreme Court established the right of judicial consideration, 
through a de novo hearing, for a defendant's claim of citizenship subsequent to 
a deportation order where any genuine issue of material fact exists regarding 
citizenship.267 Justice Brandeis, writing for the majority, recognized that the 
fifth amendment guarantee of due process entitled two alleged aliens, who were 
258 See supra text accompanying notes 202-207. 
259Id. In other words, the individual's grant of citizenship is invalid as having been wrongfully 
procured. 
260 L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 507 § 10-7 (1973) [hereinafter cited as TRIBE]. See generally 
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976). See also supra note 247. 
261 DUll, 426 U.S. at 78. This is exemplified in Congress' ability to deport aliens but not citizens. 
262 See supra notes 202-23 and accompanying text. 
263 See generally Costelio, 365 U.S. at 269-70, 283-84; Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. at 97. 
264 Hampton v. Mow Sun Wang, 426 U.S. 88,100-01 (1976); Diaz, 426 U.S. at 77. 
265 See supra text accompanying notes 208-20. 
266 Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922). 
267Id. at 283-85. 
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specifically deportable under the Chinese Exclusion Laws, to a determination 
of citizenship by a judical body. However, he held that they did not have to be 
discharged from the deportation order.26B This basic procedural right, which 
only requires an eventual judicial determination of the citizenship issue and not 
a preliminary determination, has been reaffirmed by the Court and through 
statutory enactment by Congress.269 
The bifurcated initial procedure, which would permit a judicial determination 
of deportability if the former Nazi persecutor's naturalized citizenship were first 
found to be invalid, would not violate the guarantee of due process.270 If an 
individual's citizenship status can be determined after a finding of deportability 
is made, as in Ng Fung Ho and its statutory embodiment, 8 U.S.C. § l105a(a)(5), 
then a denaturalized individual's deportability can be passed upon prior to 
taking an appeal on the validity of the citizenship issue.271 Additionally, the 
broad scope of review afforded the decision on appeal enhances the procedural 
due process provided by the consolidated denaturalization and deportation 
procedure.272 Both the denaturalization and deportation orders would be sub-
ject to reconsideration of the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by 
the district court.273 If the reviewing court found infirmities in the lower court's 
determinations on the citizenship issue and reversed in favor of the defendant, 
then the finding of deportation would also be reversed since the jurisdictional 
fact of alienage would not have been proven.274 Therefore, consolidation would 
provide a defendant with a sufficient opportunity to attack the lower court's 
determinations prior to the actual implementation of a deportation order.275 
A final possible concern would be whether, in the later deportation session, 
the use of the prior findings of facts from the initial revocation portion violates 
due process.276 Since this is now permitted through utilization of offensive 
collateral estoppel in deportation hearings, it appears that this use of the facts 
would not be violative.277 Overall, the procedural protections afforded the de-
fendant in the consolidated proceeding would satisfy due process requirements. 
268Id. at 285. 
269 See Agosto v. INS, 436 U.S. 748, 752-53 (1978); Kessler, 307 U.S. at 34-35; Bilokums!ry, 263 U.S. 
at 152-53. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1l05a(a)(5), which provides an exception to the general provision for 
judicial review of deportation orders, see supra note 139, providing for de novo hearing in a federal 
district court in cases where the person subject to deportation claims to be a U.S. citizen. 
270 See cf Agosto, 436 U.S. at 752-53. 
271 Id. See supra text accompanying notes 217-20. 
272 See supra text accompanying note 220. 
273 !d. 
274 See supra note 8. 
215 See supra text accompanying notes 221-22. 
276 See supra notes 208-16. 
277 See Matter of Fedorenko, supra note 16, at 11. See also supra notes 208-16. 
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D. Equal Protection 
Although the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is not 
applicable to actions of the federal government, the concept of equal protection 
may be found within the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 278 The 
fifth amendment prohibits unequal classifications where the discrimination is so 
unjustifiable that it violates due process.279 
Under traditional equal protection analysis, a classification of a group of 
individuals which serves to discriminate comes under varying degrees of judicial 
scrutiny, depending upon which governmental body created the classification 
and the rights at stake.280 The least strict standard of review, the rational basis 
test, is the standard which applies in scrutinizing the proposed consolidated 
denaturalization/deportation proceeding for two reasons. First, the creation of 
the procedure would be a congressional action, subject to usual equal protection 
treatment afforded federal action by Congress.281 Acts of Congress are pre-
sumed to be constitutional unless it can be shown that such law creates a 
classification which gives rise to unequal treatment, and that the classification 
bears no rational relation to a legitimate governmental purpose.282 Thus, the 
rational basis test is applicable wherever Congress creates such a classification. 
Secondly, the specific area of law involved in the consolidated procedure, im-
migration and naturalization law, has traditionally been recognized as being 
under the paramount power of the federal government through Congress.283 
Measures taken within this area need only be scrutinized to determine whether 
a legitimate government interest is at issue.284 
The enactment of the consolidated procedure applicable to the alleged former 
Nazi persecutor would create a classification that gives rise to unequal treat-
ment. 285 It would distinguish naturalized citizens alleged to have wrongfully 
procured their grants of citizenship due to past involvement with Nazi perse-
cution from all other naturalized citizens alleged to have illegally or fraudulently 
obtained their certificates of naturalization.286 
278 Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 234-35 (1979); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). See 
also Sparks v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 411, 417 (W.D.Okla. 1977). 
279 Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499. 
280 TRIBE, supra note 260, at 991-94 § 16-1. 
281 See Hampton, 426 U.S. at 100-01. 
282 See Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971). See also Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 504 
(1976); Linsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911). 
28' Hampton, 426 U.S. at 100-03. 
284 Alvarez v. District Director of INS, 539 F.2d 1220, 1224 (9th Cir. 1976). See also TRIBE, supra 
note 260, at 281-82 § 5-16. 
285 See supra notes 173-20 I and accompanying text. The same is true if the procedure is made 
applicable to all former persecutors, or to all excludable aliens. 
286 !d. See 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a). 
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If Congress enacts this immigration and naturalization procedure it will be 
upheld if the rational basis test is applied and the governmental interests for 
creating such an unequal classification are considered.287 There is a reasonable 
basis for Congress' actions involving this class of individuals. Nazi persecutors 
are intrinsically deportable upon the proof introduced in the denaturalization 
proceeding.288 Their initial excludability and thus their ineligibility for both U.S. 
citizenship and residence, stems from their past heinous acts.289 The unique 
nature of these individuals' past activity warrants the creation of a special 
procedure to adjudicate their cases.290 As a class, Congress has already singled 
out Nazi persecutors for special treatment under immigration law sanctions 
through the Holtzman Amendment. 291 
The fact that the classification in the consolidated procedure singles out the 
alleged Nazi persecutor as naturalized citizen, rather than as alien, would not 
alter this equal protection analysis. 292 In a comparable area that concerns a 
discriminating classification of U.S. citizens, the Supreme Court has consistently 
upheld statutory distinctions between natural-born citizen children of alien 
parents and of U.S. citizen parents for the purpose of subjecting the alien 
parents to immigration sanctions.293 The distinctions in question involved age 
requirements for citizen minors to petition for their parents' admission into the 
United States. The congressional purpose behind these requirements was to 
prevent total circumvention of immigration and nationality law by persons who 
illegally entered the United States, and then promptly had children to attempt 
to evade deportation. 294 This classification of minors who are nevertheless citi-
zens of the United States has been upheld even where the deportation of the 
287 See generally Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 794-96; Diaz, 426 U.S. at 81-82. An equal protection challenge 
by a former Nazi persecutor in a denaturalization case was rejected. Kairys, 782 F.2d at 1383. The 
defendant argued that the action discriminates against naturalized citizens by enabling revocation of 
citizenship without the requirement of intentional action constituting relinquishment, as is needed in 
an expatriation action. [d. See also supra note 28. The court held that because there are no pre-
citizenship acts to prescribe for natives, naturalized citizens may be treated differently without violating 
the equal protection clause. Kairys, 782 F.2d at 1383. (Congress, in regulating the standards for 
denaturalization, may take into account the inherent differences of citizenship between native and 
naturalized citizens). See also, Linnas, supra note 109, at 18 (Nazi war criminals are not a class of 
persons entitled to strict scrutiny under equal protection analysis; a rational relationship, being the 
applicable standard, exists between the deportation of Nazi war criminals and a legitimate legislative 
purpose). 
288 See Matter of Fedorenko, supra note 16, at II. 
289 See supra note 182. 
290 See supra notes 173-83 and accompanying text; see also infra note 332. 
291 See supra notes 173-201 and accompanying text. See also, Linnas, supra note 109, at 18. 
292 See United States ex rel. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 353 U.S. 72, 77 (1957). 
29, !d. See also Papakonstantinou v. Civelleti, 496 F. Supp. 105, 110-11 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Perdido v. 
INS, 420 F.2d 1179, 1181-82 (5th Cir. 1969). 
294 Hernandez-Rivera v. INS, 630 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1980); Urbano de Malaluan v. INS, 577 F.2d 
589, 594 (9th Cir. 1978). 
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alien parents results in the de facto deportation of the minor U.S. citizen.295 
Classification of the alleged former Nazi persecutor which warrants unique 
procedural treatment is no more discriminatory.296 If a Nazi persecutor illegally 
entered the United States and subsequently obtained a voidable grant of natu-
ralized citizenship, he is shielding himself from deportability. There is a ration-
ally based national interest in preventing this result, especially in light of Con-
gress' specific inclusion of the former Nazi persecutor within the excludable/ 
deportable classes.297 
VI. PROCEDURAL FEASIBILITY OF CONSOLIDATED DENATURALIZATION AND 
DEPORTATION PROCESS 
A. Legal Similarities 
A consolidation of the judicial and administrative contexts by which denatur-
alization and deportation are conducted would be feasible. The two procedures 
are similar and are significantly compatible in their methods and standards of 
proof.298 
The current denaturalization and deportation procedures were both initially 
created within the INA.299 Although the INA could have put deportation within 
a judicially adjudicated context, Congress chose to entrust the deportation 
function to the executive branch through the INS.300 Therefore, this adminis-
trativejudicial distinction between deportation and denaturalization would not 
preclude a consolidated judicial proceeding exception. Both denaturalization 
and deportation proceedings now operate similarly, especially in the Nazi per-
secutor cases. They involve a civil action initiated by the government, which is 
represented in both procedures by the OSI, in the Nazi cases.301 Neither sanction 
295 Urbano de Malaluan, 577 F.2d at 594. 
296 The same argument can be made for classifications based on either all persecutors or all exclud-
able aliens. Both would present a variety of national interest assertions for satisfaction of the rational 
basis test. See supra text accompanying notes 260-65. 
297 See supra note 2. Similarly, an existing rational basis could be asserted for either of the other two 
possible classifications. See supra notes 173-201 and accompanying text. The constitutionality of either 
of the three classifications rests upon the same dispositive factor: whether it is discriminatory to 
distinguish between different categories of naturalized citizens, for the purposes of the consolidated 
proceeding. See supra text accompanying notes 285-88. Congress could choose to only include Nazi 
persecutors, the smallest classification, since the Supreme Court has upheld Congress' power to classify 
in a method which only attacks one piece of an existing problem at a time. See Williamson v. Lee 
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). 
298 See infra text accompanying notes 299-324. 
299 See INA, supra note 4. 
300 See generally Woojan, 245 U.S. at 556-57. See also GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 32, at 6-7 
§ 5.1. See also supra note 111. 
301 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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is subject to a statute of limitations, and each may be applied retroactively.302 
Both proceedings demand that the government prove its case by the heightened 
burden of clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence.303 Both apply the same 
case law standards to the issue of ~ateriality where fraud or concealment come 
into question.304 Finally, both are subject to review by appeals through the 
federal judiciary.305 These similarities make the consolidated denaturalization! 
deportation proceeding feasible. 
Where the two proceedings are legally dissimilar, the necessary changes would 
be made to the deportation segment. The aspects of current deportation law 
which would need to be altered are the initiation of service and notice,306 
compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of 
Evidence,307 the shifting burden upon the defendant, and the scope of review 
on appeaP08 
In each of these areas, the existing practice within the denaturalization pro-
cedure would apply. Although the deportation segment of the consolidated 
process would require these alterations, the actual methods of proving each 
case are significantly compatible. Therefore, the consolidated proceeding would 
be practical and workable, even in its bifurcated structure.309 
In OSI's cases against alleged Nazi persecutors, major aspects of the adjudi-
cative process, including the ultimate facts needed to be proved, and the stan-
dards needed to be met to prove the allegations, are identical and therefore 
easily combined into a single action. 310 In both denaturalization and deportation 
cases against alleged former Nazi persecutors, the following basic factual alle-
gations must be proved: first, the defendant's past involvement with Nazi per-
secution and subsequent application for and grant of an immigration visa; and 
second, the defendant's inadmissibility, under either previous or existing appli-
cable law, to enter the United States due to such past history.311 
Offensive collateral estoppel now is applied in the later deportation hearing 
to preclude relitigation of factual findings and conclusions of law made in the 
initial denaturalization trial.312 In deportation proceedings brought against Feo-
302 See supra notes 35-37 , 96-98 & 100 and accompanying text. 
303 See supra notes 76-81 and 150-54. 
304 See supra notes 41 and llO. 
305 See supra notes 73 and 139. 
306 28 U.S.C. § 1254; 8 U.S.C. § 1l05a(a)(6)(c). 
307 8 U.S.C. § 1451(b); 8 C.F.R. § 242.1. 
:10' See supra notes 141 & 152. 
:10. See supra notes 202-23 and accompanying text. 
310 Matter of Fedorenko, supra note 16, at 11. See also text accompanying notes 304-05. 
31' Matter of Fedorenko, supra note 16, at 11. 
3I2 Id. Parties who have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the preliminary 
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dor Fedorenko, after his denaturalization was upheld by the Supreme Court, 
the BIA ruled that the deportation issues ''[arose] out of the identical facts and 
the same principles of law that were considered by the Supreme Court in the 
denaturalization case," and therefore the application of collateral estoppel was 
upheld. 313 In Matter of Fedorenko, the BIA distinguished three general categories 
of ultimate facts in the case: facts pertaining to Fedorenko's citizenship and 
nationality; facts pertaining to his activities during World War II; and facts 
pertaining to his application for a visa and his immigration to the United 
States.3 [4 Based on these determinations, a district court could apply both den-
aturalization and deportation law to rule on whether the defendant's citizenship 
should be revoked, and then, if so, whether the defendant is a deportable 
alien. 315 The methods of proof in the Nazi persecution case are thus so com-
patible that the consolidated, albeit bifurcated, trial would not only be feasible, 
but could also depend upon the same evidence in both segments.3 [6 The gov-
ernment would most likely be able to file for a motion of summary judgment 
on the issue of deportability, based on the prior findings of fact and conclusions 
of law.3 [7 
This procedural convenience would not, however, preclude the Nazi perse-
cutor/defendant from introducing other evidence, not previously considered, 
to assert additional defenses in the later deportation phase.3 [S 
Another unique facet of the Nazi persecutor cases is the defendant's lack of 
eligibility to apply for any existing statutory form of discretionary relief from 
deportation.319 In the bifurcated trial of the proposed consolidation, the court 
would not reach the issue of deportability until it conclusively found that the 
defendant's citizenship was invalid due to past involvement with Nazi persecu-
tion.320 Therefore, since such an individual is automatically precluded from 
being eligible to apply for any form of discretionary relief, no consideration 
would be required in the later deportation segment.32 [ Overall, the denatural-
judicial hearing can use collateral estoppel offensively in a second administrative civil hearing without 
offending the policies behind the doctrine and behind due process. Id. See also supra notes 210-11. 
313 Matter of Fedorenko, supra note 16, at 4. See also Matter of Demjanjuk, supra note 211, at 9 
(immigration judge found that a denaturalized former Nazi collaborator who ran the gas chambers at 
Treblinka, is deportable by evidence that is clear, convincing and unequivocal). 
314 Matter of Fedorenko, supra note 16, at 11-12. 
315 See id. 
3[6Id. See also supra note 215. 
317 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see also supra note 216. 
318 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a). See also supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text. 
319 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e), 1253(h), 1254(a), 1254(e). See also notes 129-30 and accompanying text. 
320 See supra text accompanying notes 202-07. 
321 See supra text accompanying notes 213-14. Although only deportability based upon 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1251(a)(l9) precludes the eligibilty of the deportee for discretionary relief, all successful deportation 
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ized Nazi persecutor is either deportable with no discretionary relief available, 
or he is not deportable.322 
The lack of equitable discretion in the hands of judges, to excuse a defendant's 
failure to comply with all statutory conditions precedent to naturalization, fur-
ther enhances the feasibility of the proposed consolidated denaturalizationl 
deportation proceeding.323 As in a regular denaturalization action, the district 
judge would not have discretion to overlook proven failures to meet the required 
prerequisites to naturalization imposed by Congress.324 This would further limit 
the considerations the judge would have before him and make the Nazi per-
secution cases even more workable within a consolidated procedure. 
B. Feasibility of Deportation Issue: Consideration by Federal District Court Judges 
All adjudication of deportation at the initial stage is now administrative and 
takes place in hearings before an immigration judge.325 The proposed consoli-
dation would elevate the consideration of deportability to the federal district 
courtS. 326 This could be problematic since judicial expertise in deciding such a 
specialized statutory area as deportation is limited. 327 At present, distriCt courts 
do not have jurisdiction to hear deportation cases at their initial stage.328 None-
theless, this situation would not create an insurmountable barrier to the feasi-
bility of the proposed consolidated proceeding. First, Congress has frequently 
redetermined federal court jurisdiction, mandating federal judges to master 
areas of law previously unfamiliar to them. 329 There is also a great amount of 
existing case law in this area of deportation, both through the administrative 
determinations made, and through appellate determinations made by the circuit 
courtS.330 The amount of applicable deportation law utilized in the consolidated 
proceeding for Nazi persecutors would be limited. The proceeding itself would 
orders against Nazi persecutors who are excludable at entry will involve a charge of deportability, 
based on the actual past history of the individual pursuant to 8 U .S.C. § 1251 (a)(l9). 
322 Cf supra note 218. 
323 See supra text accompanying notes 50-51. 
324 See supra note 50. 
325 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b). This condition would not have been altered by passage of the Simpson-
Mazzoli bill, see supra note 118, which as proposed would only have elevated the immigration judge to 
the level of an administrative law judge. Authority over the adjudicative process would have been 
taken out of INS, but still would be maintained within the Department of Justice through the creation 
of an Immigration Board. Id. As indicated, this last version of the bill was not acted upon before the 
98th Congress adjourned. Id. 
326 See supra text accompanying notes 208-09 & 261-62. 
327 See 8 U.S.C. §§ l105a(a), 1252(b), 1329. See aLso note 138. 
328 8 U.S.C. § 1329. 
329 In fact, the 1961 amendment creating a statutory right to judicial review of deportation orders 
in the courts of appeals, see supra note 139, did just this. See House Report 1086, supra note 38. 
330 See GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 32, at 20 § 1.136. The administrative decisions are pub-
lished and are often cited in the courts of appeals decisions. See, e.g., Maikovskis, 773 F.2d at 438-39. 
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be limited to a specific category of cases, which do not encompass any consid-
eration of discretionary relieP31 This serves to diminish the amount of addi-
tional expertise needed to consider the issues in the deportation segment of the 
consolidated proceeding. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The proposed consolidated denaturalization/deportation action would pro-
vide for an initial trial in federal district court, with all the procedural rights 
already afforded to a defendant in a denaturalization action brought under 
current law. This primary adversarial proceeding would, however, be bifurcated 
in that the court as fact finder would first be required to pass upon the issue of 
citizenship before the government would be allowed to present its case on the 
issue of deportation. This would be necessary to preserve the presumption in 
favor of citizenship rooted in the citizenship clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Once an initial determination is made at the trial level, either party would 
have the same rights of appeal as participants in a civil suit in federal court. In 
such a consolidation, the defendant's right to due process guaranteed by the 
fifth amendment would not be violated. 
Congress has explicitly mandated that Nazi persecutors can be denaturalized 
and deported upon proof of their involvement with persecution of civilians on 
the basis of race, religion, national origin, or political opinion during the period 
of Nazi rule. Because the classification of these individuals is reasonably based, 
application of the procedure to them would not violate equal protection prin-
ciples found within the fifth amendment guarantee of due process. 
Congress has called for the removal of former Nazi persecutors from the 
United States. Current denaturalization and deportation cases, brought against 
alleged Nazi persecutors who have obtained naturalized citizenship, demand 
additional specific legislative treatment. The entire process needs to be expe-
dited and simplified, from revocation of citizenship to the order of deportation. 
The proposed consolidation of these two processes into a single bifurcated 
original proceeding in federal district court, with federal rights of appellate 
review, would accomplish this needed improvement. It would also enhance the 
effectiveness with which the U.S. government can finally prevent the country 
from serving as a safe haven for former Nazi persecutors.332 
331 See supra note 130. 
332 Although the main purpose of the denaturalization and deportation of a former Nazi persecutor 
is to bring the individual in question before the law for his alleged violations of immigration law. see 
RYAN, supra note 3, at 335, such cases do produce certain ancillary objectives. They put on the record 
a response by the U.S. government to the presence of former persecutors in the United States, after 
many years of delay and inaction. See also RYAN, supra note 3, at 337. 
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Allan Ryan Jr. has stated, "we are proceeding against [former Nazi persecu-
tors] under the law not because of what they might do in the future but because 
to look the other way would be necessarily to forgive what they did in the 
past."333 Nevertheless, to proceed against them in an unnecessarily inefficient 
manner is to display a lack of will in attempting to bring these former Nazi 
persecutors to justice. A delay of justice is, in itself, injustice. Therefore, Con-
gress should use its broad power over this area of the law, and pass legislation 
that implements a consolidated denaturalization/deportation procedure. 
William Mandell 
333 RYAN, supra note 3, at 339. In his book, QUIET NEIGHBORS: PROSECUTING NAZI WAR CRIMINALS 
IN AMERICA, supra note 3, Ryan further explains the need to take effective action against individuals 
who directly participated in Nazi persecution: 
Look to the next century, or look to our own. The lesson is the same. The Holocaust was 
mass murder as political policy, and civilized people must reject it in every form, at every 
opportunity. Of the hundreds of thousands who carried out this campaign in Germany and 
Europe forty years ago, those who remain in the United States today are only the aging 
remnants. Yet we know they are here and we know that they broke the law to get here and 
stay here and live here in peace. To say that they pose no danger to anyone because they are 
old people misses the point entirely .... What we are doing today should have been done 
thirty-five years ago. But to grant these people repose from the law in [the 1980's] would 
mean that their thirty-five years of silence and our thirty-five years of inaction somehow atone 
for their awful crimes, and that justice is the result. We should not accept that insidious logic, 
nor can we accept it merely because the criminals are fewer and older today. 
[d. See also supra note 7. 
